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Abstract 
We study whether community based interventions improve risk sharing in rural Malawi. We 
focus on improvements in risk sharing arising as a result of design features of these 
interventions. We use a 2 year panel dataset collected within a cluster randomised trial to 
investigate whether two community based interventions - a participatory women’s group 
intervention and a home-based infant feeding intervention - targeted at improving 
reproductive and infant health, improve risk sharing amongst households following crop 
losses. We find strong evidence that such interventions help protect household consumption 
against a crop loss. Investigation of underlying channels rules out direct health effects and 
income smoothing, and suggests that increased social interactions due to the interventions 
may be the main driver. 
 
Keywords: consumption smoothing, adverse events, participatory interventions, Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
JEL Classification: E21, G22, O12 
Acknowledgements:  The  authors  would  like  to  thank  the  Bureau  of  International  Labor  Affairs  at  the 
Department of Labor for both their financial support and comments on the manuscript. The data used in this 
paper was collected thanks to the  financial support of grant RES‐183‐25‐008  jointly awarded by The William 
and Flora Hewlett Foundation and The Economic and Social Research Council. All errors are the responsibility 
of the authors. We thank the Mai Mwana team, especially Tambozi Phiri, Andrew Mganga, Nicholas Mbwana, 
Christopher Kamphinga,  Sonia  Lewycka,  and Mikey Rosato  for  their  advice  and  assistance  in  collecting  the 
data.  Julia  Behrman,  Senthuran  Bhuvanendra,  Lena  Lepuschuetz,  and  Carys  Roberts  provided  excellent 
research assistance. 
 
Correspondence: emla_f@ifs.org.uk; bansi_m@ifs.org.uk; m.vera@ucl.ac.uk  
 
* Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.  
† Institute for Fiscal Studies, London and University College London. 
§ Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London. 
  2
1. Introduction	
Households in developing countries face a wide variety of risks and uncertainty, including 
agricultural risk, employment risk and health risks, which can have adverse consequences for 
household income.  On top of this, formal insurance is very thin in these economies - in 
Malawi, the environment we study here, just 3% of adults own some kind of formal insurance 
product - and government welfare policies are nowhere near as widespread as in Western 
Europe and North America. Given this, households often seek other, less formal, ways to 
insure income, and hence consumption, against risk. Methods documented in the literature 
include sharing agricultural inputs, labour sharing agreements, inter-linked transactions, gifts 
and loans from family and friends, and credit co-operatives, among others (Besley, 1995).1 
However, there is an important body of evidence that suggests that the mechanisms that 
households put together to provide insurance fail to completely protect their consumption 
from risk, hardship and adverse events (Townsend (1994), Dercon and Krishnan (2000), 
Gertler and Gruber (2002), Attanasio and Szekely (2004)). Household consumption thus 
remains vulnerable to the vagaries of the economies in which they live. 
 
The failure of full insurance suggests that there exist numerous barriers to sharing risk using 
informal arrangements in these environments, the most important ones being limited 
commitment, moral hazard and hidden income. Limited commitment arises from the fact that 
any informal arrangement needs to be self-sustaining: households receiving a higher income 
need to have incentives to induce them to continue participating in the informal agreement 
(Coate and Ravallion (1993), Kocherlakota (1996)). Moral hazard arises from the fact that 
individuals who are insured may lack the incentive to exert effort (unobservable to others) to 
prevent them from having to resort to that insurance (Ligon, 1997). Hidden income arises 
from the fact that households have an incentive to mask their true income: for instance, a 
household receiving a high income may not want to reveal this in order to avoid making 
transfer payments to other households, while households receiving a low income or 
experiencing an adverse event have an incentive to over-exaggerate the severity of the loss 
(Kinnan, 2010). Limited commitment could potentially be solved by mechanisms that 
improve commitment, such as those that increase trust between the parties of an informal 
arrangement. Problems of moral hazard and hidden income could potentially be solved by 
improved screening and monitoring, but both are costly to the insurer. A recent literature has 
                                                            
1 Appendix 1 contains a more complete review of the literature relevant to this paper. 
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investigated theoretically the implications of these barriers on informal arrangements, and has 
tested these implications on household data. Ligon et al (2003) find, for India, that limited 
commitment can explain the response of consumption to income shocks, but not the 
distribution of consumption. Kinnan (2010) compares all three barriers in the context of 
Thailand and finds that hidden income is the most relevant barrier in this context.  Yet the 
literature remains far from conclusive on the relative importance of these barriers in 
preventing full risk sharing. 
 
Given this, government policies that – whether intentionally or not – offer scope for 
improved commitment, screening and monitoring, may also improve risk sharing amongst 
households. For instance, policies that bring villagers in closer contact with each other may 
increase social interactions amongst them, and open up opportunities for engaging in 
informal risk sharing by increasing trust and the sharing of information. Community-based 
interventions, particularly participatory ones, which have become increasingly popular in 
recent years, are well-placed to do this. By community-based intervention, we refer to 
interventions that involve the local community (most usually, a village) at some step of the 
intervention, be it in targeting, volunteering, or more extensive participation. Participatory 
community interventions are a subset of community-based interventions that rely on 
community engagement and participation, and that have in the past focused on health 
promotion activities aimed at changing individual behaviour, and more recently been used to 
allocate aid to local public goods projects (for example, the Malawi Social Action Fund 
encourages substantial community participation for local public goods). They involve 
community participation at numerous stages of the intervention, from group meetings to 
choosing local public goods and implementing the chosen goods. Though the direct aim of 
this type of policy is not to provide insurance or to encourage risk sharing, we consider in this 
paper the extent to which this may be a beneficial side effect of it. To the best of our 
knowledge, few existing studies investigate the effects of government policies in developing 
countries on consumption smoothing and risk sharing, particularly for policies that do not 
directly have consumption smoothing as one of its main goals. Exceptions include Albarran 
and Attanasio (2003), who find that conditional cash transfers are limited in improving 
consumption smoothing, as they crowd out informal risk sharing, Kaboski and Townsend 
(2006) who find that households in villages with well-run microfinance institutions attain 
better consumption smoothing in rural Thailand, and Fafchamps and La Ferrara 
(forthcoming) who find that self-help groups in urban Kenya play a mutual assistance role.  
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Understandably, evaluation of policies tends to prioritise the effects on the key outcomes 
being targeted by the policy - for instance on health, in the case of community-based 
participatory health interventions. In this paper however, we consider a potential indirect 
effect of this type of policy - its effect on consumption smoothing - and in so doing provide 
evidence for policy makers on the ‘unplanned’ impacts of policies. This is important for 
policy makers in designing policies going forward: if there is evidence that they have 
beneficial effects on unintended aspects of behaviour, it strengthens the case for promoting 
such policies even further.  
 
This paper considers whether community-based interventions in Malawi that are aimed 
specifically at improving reproductive and infant health, also facilitate risk sharing and thus 
consumption smoothing.  In particular, it examines the response of household consumption to 
household crop losses, and tests whether this is different across villages that do and do not 
receive the interventions. It considers two types of community-based interventions: a 
participatory women’s group intervention, and a home-based infant feeding intervention. The 
former directly increases the amount of interaction amongst villagers, who come together in 
groups on a regular basis to discuss reproductive health issues; the latter involves home visits 
from an infant feeding counsellor, which could improve consumption smoothing by 
encouraging the sharing of information. The focus on crop losses is driven by the fact that 
this type of adverse event is relatively important in our setting – rural Malawi, where almost 
all households are engaged in agriculture - and can have important consequences for 
household well-being (Beegle et al (2006)). Further, the focus is on idiosyncratic household 
adverse events, crop losses.2 Indeed, we include village-level dummy variables in the 
estimation, to net out the effects of aggregate village shocks.  
 
We find strong evidence that consumption smoothing occurs in the presence of community-
based interventions. Indeed, we find that potential losses to consumption due to crop losses 
are completely offset in the presence of the interventions. We consider three possible 
channels through which these improvements in consumption smoothing arise: an increase in 
social interactions, health improvements, and a reduction in the incidence of crop losses. We 
                                                            
2  To  our  knowledge,  there was  no major  drought  or  flood  in  our  study  area when  the  data we  use were 
collected. 
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rule out the latter two channels and find evidence suggesting that increased social interactions 
created by these interventions drive the improved risk sharing. 
 
Our results have important implications for policymakers. First, they highlight the importance 
of considering unintended consequences of policies when evaluating that policy. They also 
highlight the importance of cross-discipline collaboration in the policy design and evaluation 
process: while the programmes we evaluate focused on improving health, their particular 
designs generated improvements in socio-economic outcomes. Cross-disciplinary policy 
evaluation enables us to get a clearer picture of the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of these 
interventions, and also to obtain a more complete understanding of livelihood strategies 
employed by the communities in focus. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the scene – describing the background to the 
environment we are considering, and the community-based interventions we consider. It also 
includes a discussion of how the interventions may result in improved risk sharing. In section 
3 we lay out the empirical model that is estimated.  Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and 
findings respectively. In section 6 we investigate the channels through which consumption 
smoothing may be taking place. Section 7 summarises policy implications and section 8 
concludes.  
 
2.	Background	and	Interventions	
2.1 The Setting 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with around three quarters of 
the population living on less than $1.25 a day.3 Over 80% of the population live in rural 
areas, with agricultural activities providing the main source of income for a very substantial 
proportion of these. Further, infrastructure in rural areas is very weak, with around one in 
sixteen households having access to electricity, and one in five households having access to 
piped water.4 Agriculture is mainly rain-fed, and agricultural crops and income are thus 
highly dependent on the unpredictable weather. Access to formal insurance and financial 
products and services is very rare, with only 3% of adults owning an insurance product and 
                                                            
3 Source: World Bank, Development Research Group, available from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY/countries/MW?display=graph 
4 Source: Malawi Population and Housing Census, 2008. 
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less than 20% having a formal bank account.5 In this context, family, friends and community 
members are likely to be very important for consumption smoothing, particularly when 
households are hit by adverse shocks. 
 
2.2 The Interventions 
The interventions that we consider in this paper are both aimed at improving reproductive and 
infant health, and were set up by the Mai Mwana project, a research and development 
organisation based in Mchinji District, Central Malawi. Mchinji District lies to the west of the 
capital, Lilongwe, and on the border with Zambia and Mozambique. Socio-economic 
conditions in Mchinji are comparable to or poorer than the average for Malawi (in 
parentheses in what follows), with literacy rates of just over 60% (64%), poor quality flooring 
materials used by 85% (78%) of households, piped water access for 10% (20%) of 
households, and electricity access for just 2% (7%) of households.6 Mai Mwana, along with 
researchers at University College London, set up a study to assess the effectiveness of these 
interventions in improving maternal and neonatal health outcomes. To this end, in 2005 the 
interventions were randomly assigned among 48 clusters in the District. The two 
interventions – a participatory women’s group intervention and a home-based infant feeding 
counselling intervention – along with the experimental design, are described in more detail in 
what follows.  
 
2.2.1 Participatory women’s group intervention  
The goals of this intervention are to impart information and to mobilise the local community 
on issues relating to pregnancy, childbirth and newborn health.7 It does this in a participatory 
manner, in the sense that community members are involved in every step of the intervention, 
and learning takes place in a collaborative manner. The way it works in practice is that Mai 
Mwana trains local facilitators nominated by locals, who then visit villages to encourage 
women to form groups to discuss the above issues. The groups, which meet fortnightly, 
follow a participatory action four-stage cycle of meetings where, under the guidance of the 
facilitator, the first stage involves identifying problems faced by group members relating to 
                                                            
5 Source: Finscope Malawi Survey 2008. Report available at 
http://www.finscope.co.za/documents/2009/Brochure_Malawi08.pdf 
6 Source: Malawi Population and Housing Census 2008. 
7 We consider a community to be a set of households living in the same village. Throughout, we use the terms 
community and village interchangeably. 
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pregnancy, childbirth and newborn health.8 In the second stage of the cycle, the groups share 
the results of their discussions with non-group members of the community, including men9, 
and use these discussions to devise strategies to overcome identified problems.10 The 
women’s groups then report these strategies back to the community and, in the third stage of 
the cycle, involve the wider community to aid in the implementation of the strategies. In the 
final stage, the community evaluates the performance of these strategies and their impacts on 
their priorities. This intervention follows a similar design to interventions implemented in 
Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Bolivia, which have been shown to be effective at improving 
health in Bolivia11, Nepal and India and ineffective in Bangladesh (see Manandhar et al 
(2004), Tripathy et al (2010), and Azad et al (2010) for more details). Participation rates in 
the women’s groups studied here stand at just under 30% of all women aged 15 and over, 
compared with 2% of all men aged 15 and over.  
 
2.2.2 Infant feeding counselling intervention  
The second intervention implemented by Mai Mwana is an infant feeding counselling one, in 
which Mai Mwana trains volunteers nominated by the local community on issues relating to 
infant feeding. Following training, the volunteers visit expectant women five times in their 
homes – once before the birth of the child to discuss birth-preparedness, and the rest for up to 
5 months after the birth to discuss issues relating to breastfeeding and post-breastfeeding 
nutrition for the infant. Participation in this intervention is higher than in the women’s group 
one, with around 55% - 60% of women with infants born after 2005 report having been 
visited by a Mai Mwana counsellor.  
 
2.3 The Experimental Design 
The experimental evaluation was designed as follows12: Mchinji District was divided into 48 
zones, each containing approximately 8,000 individuals. From this, around 3,000 individuals, 
                                                            
8 Rosato  et al  (2007)  summarise  the problems  identified by  the  groups  in  this  setting  relating  to maternal 
health  (anaemia, obstructed  labour, malaria,  retained placenta, and haemorrhaging, amongst others), while 
Rosato  et  al  (2009)  summarise  those  relating  to  neonatal  and  infant  health  (diarrhoea,  pre‐term  births, 
tetanus, asphyxia, infection and malaria).   
9 While we  refer  to  this  intervention as a women’s  group  intervention,  the  groups  included men  from  the 
second stage of the cycle onwards.  
10 Some of the strategies that have been implemented include communal vegetable farms, animal husbandry, 
communal bakeries, bicycle ambulances and childcare centres. 
11 Note that these improvements were not identified from a randomised experimental study, but from a study 
comparing outcomes before and after the intervention. 
12 Lewycka et al (2010) contains more details. 
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living in the centre or close to the centre of each zone, were selected to be part of the study 
area, leaving buffer areas between the study areas in adjacent zones. The zones were 
randomised on a two-by-two factorial design, with 24 zones first randomly chosen to receive 
the women’s group intervention. Thereafter, of the 24 zones with women’s groups, 12 were 
chosen at random to also receive the infant feeding counselling intervention; similarly, of the 
24 zones without women’s groups, 12 were chosen randomly to receive the infant feeding 
counselling intervention. This results in 4 sets of treatments13, each covering 12 zones:  
T1: Control  
T2: Women’s Group only (WG) 
T3: Infant Feeding Counselling only (IFC) 
T4: Women’s Groups and Infant Feeding Counselling (BOTH) 
 
In 2004 all women aged 10 to 49 living in the study areas were enrolled in the study. Women 
in this age range who later moved into the study areas were also subsequently enrolled. There 
is an average of 17 villages within each zone. The village is the unit at which we consider 
consumption smoothing to take place. This is for a number of reasons. First, women’s groups 
are generally formed within a village. Second, the village forms an important hub of social 
life in rural Malawi, and so a majority of social interactions take place within it. Third, 
households are more likely to interact with other households that are geographically close to 
them, and turn to them for support in the case of idiosyncratic adverse events.  
 
2.4	How	might	the	interventions	improve	consumption	smoothing?	
The design of the interventions provides a range of channels through which they can improve 
consumption smoothing. As mentioned in the introduction, the key focus of this paper is on 
idiosyncratic crop losses (measurement discussed in section 4).14 It is important to distinguish 
between idiosyncratic and aggregate events when analysing the extent to which consumption 
smoothing takes place: full insurance protects against idiosyncratic (household-specific) 
adversities, but not against aggregate (village-wide) ones. So our test of risk sharing is a test 
of whether household consumption is protected against idiosyncratic adverse events. We next 
summarise the three key pathways through which community-based interventions might 
improve consumption smoothing following an idiosyncratic crop loss. 
                                                            
13 Throughout, the terms ‘treatment’ and ‘intervention’ are used interchangeably. 
14 Throughout, we take the household to be the main unit of observation, and so an idiosyncratic event refers 
to a household‐level event. 
  9
 
2.4.1	Improved	informal	risk	sharing		
The participatory women’s group intervention provides, first and foremost, a forum for 
women to interact on a frequent basis with other community members, facilitating the sharing 
of information, not just about health, but also about other topics and local issues, thus 
reducing asymmetric information amongst community members. But there is another, more 
subtle, feature of the intervention which can improve informal risk sharing: by providing a 
forum for regular meetings, it facilitates the enforceability of risk sharing arrangements. The 
way in which it does this is by increasing the cost of deviation: if a household deviates from 
an informal insurance arrangement, other households have available a credible threat to 
punish it - to take an extreme example – by expelling it from the group (much like in micro-
credit group loans), thus denying it access not only to valuable health information, but also to 
potential monetary and in-kind benefits15, and other potential non-monetary benefits such as 
organisational skills and improved access to jobs. Put differently, the intervention, by 
increasing the range of punishments available, increases the cost of deviation, thus relaxing 
the limited commitment barrier described in the introduction, and allowing for a wider set of 
informal arrangements to be sustained. 
 
The infant feeding intervention may increase information sharing generally in the village, by 
encouraging women to share information on reproductive health and infant care practices, 
along with other local issues. This increased sharing of information can improve risk sharing 
by easing the asymmetric information barrier to informal risk sharing.  
 
2.4.2	Improved	health	
Though the interventions are targeted at reproductive and infant health, it is not infeasible 
that they also result in better health more generally within the household, for instance by 
increasing awareness of health issues. This may put households in a better position to cope 
with any adverse events that occur – being in good condition physically may mean that a 
householder can work harder, or diversify into different activities when faced with an adverse 
event, for instance.  
 
 
                                                            
15 There  is evidence  from  informal discussions with programme  staff  that households  involved  in women’s 
groups form collective vegetable gardens and share the proceeds from these.  
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2.4.3	Reduced	prevalence	and/or	severity	of	adverse	events	
The interventions could reduce the incidence of crop losses, thereby directly smoothing the 
household’s income stream and improving consumption smoothing. This could happen in at 
least two ways. First, as discussed above, the interventions may result in better health more 
generally within the household, which may directly reduce the incidence and/or prevalence of 
adverse events. For instance, it may result in increased effort and/or resources being put into 
agricultural production, thus reducing vulnerability to adverse events such as crop loss. 
Second, as mentioned above, the interventions may engender increased co-operation within 
the village, which may result in the increased sharing of important inputs (such as farming 
tools and labour) and knowledge, and thereby reduce exposure to crop losses. In section 6, we 
investigate which is likely to be the most relevant factor in any observed improved 
consumption smoothing.  
 
3.	Empirical	Model	
To identify whether community-based interventions improve consumption smoothing, we 
exploit the cluster randomised allocation of the interventions described above. The empirical 
model is based on tests derived by Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994). 
Our main specification is as follows: 
          (1) 
where  is the consumption growth rate for household h, living in village v between 
times t-1 and t,  refers to changes between times t-1 and t in crop loss indicators 
(incidence and severity, separately) for household h in village v, treat is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if household h lives in a zone receiving either or both of the community 
interventions in 2004 (before the start of any of the interventions), Xhvt is a vector of 
household level time-varying characteristics such as household size and demographics, and 
 is a set of village-specific time dummies which are included in order to control for any 
village-level events – in particular, to control for village-specific adversities that occur, which 
we refer to as aggregate in line with the terminology of the related literature.  
 
Under perfect consumption smoothing (or full insurance), the consumption growth rate 
should move one-to-one with the aggregate consumption growth rate.  In our case, we take 
the village to be the level at which we believe risk sharing takes place, and so aggregate 
consumption in this case would be village level consumption. If households are able to 
  11
perfectly smooth their consumption through existing mechanisms, in the absence of 
community based interventions, then we would expect the coefficient  to be equal to zero. 
If, however, they are unable to smooth their consumption following a crop loss, the 
coefficient would be negative.  identifies the consumption smoothing available to 
households in treatment areas experiencing a crop loss. The sum of the coefficients  
reveals whether households in intervention zones are perfectly able to smooth their 
consumption following an idiosyncratic crop loss.  
 
Equation (1) is derived from a model in which households have a utility function of the 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form. Mace (1991) derives an additional test from a 
model where households have a utility function of the constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) form. This test is very similar to that in equation (1), except that the left hand side 
variable relates to consumption growth ( ) rather than the consumption growth rate 
( ). In the empirical analysis that follows, we estimate both models, to assess 
robustness of findings to functional form assumptions.  
 
Two main measures of consumption are used in this study: total household non-durable 
consumption and household food consumption. The measurement and construction of these 
variables is described in section 4. We use three measures of crop loss events: a prevalence 
measure - whether a household experienced a crop loss; and two severity measures - the size 
of the crop loss in absolute terms, and the size of the crop loss relative to predicted household 
consumption. This third measure provides a better metric of the intensity of the crop loss for 
the household. Household predicted consumption is computed on the basis of pre-
intervention household characteristics including housing conditions, assets, and the education 
level of the survey respondent. The different measures allow us to detect household 
consumption smoothing on different margins.  
 
From the discussion in section 2, it is apparent that the effects of the interventions on 
consumption smoothing may vary depending on the type of intervention – infant feeding 
counselling, participatory women’s groups, or both. In the second specification, we test for 
this by allowing for different effects by type of intervention: 
          (2) 
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where variables are as defined for equation (1), and in addition, WG is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the household is living in a zone with women’s groups only, IFC is a dummy 
which equals one if the household is living in a zone with infant feeding counselling only, 
and BOTH is a dummy variable which equals one if the household is living in a zone with 
both women’s groups and infant feeding counselling.  can be interpreted as the extent to 
which women’s group interventions protect the consumption growth rate of households in the 
presence of a crop loss,  estimates this for the infant feeding counselling intervention, and 
 for the villages in which both interventions are in place. As before, total consumption 
smoothing following a crop loss in communities with women’s groups only is given by 
. For communities with infant feeding counselling only, and for communities with 
both interventions, the parameters are  and  respectively. 
4.	Data	
The main source of data used in this paper is a two year panel of just under 3,000 households 
collected by the authors in collaboration with Mai Mwana in 2008-09 and 2009-10, around 3-
4 years after the interventions started. We refer to this as the survey data. It was designed 
with two purposes in mind. First, to evaluate the economic impacts of the Mai Mwana 
interventions - it contains a wealth of socio-economic information such as non-durable 
consumption, education, labour supply, and self-reported health and anthropometric 
measurements for young children. Second, to investigate risk sharing issues such as the one 
being considered here - it contains data on adverse events experienced by the household, 
family networks, and social interactions measured as one-to-one chats. During the 2009-10 
survey, we succeeded in re-visiting 91% of the 2008-09 households.  
 
The two waves of panel data were collected using Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), which 
improved the accuracy of the data relative to paper questionnaires.16 In addition to the 
household survey, we collected detailed information on market level food prices, with repeat 
visits to the same markets in different months to attenuate any seasonality effects. 
 
As it is common practice in the consumption smoothing literature, we restrict the sample to 
households that were resident in the same village over both survey rounds. This is in order to 
                                                            
16 In‐built consistency checks reduced the recording of unrealistic values, and automated skip patterns reduced 
interview times and fatigue for both the interviewer and respondent.  
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control for aggregate (village-level) adverse events. This results in dropping 9% of the 
sample (of those present in both waves), leaving a final sample of 2,735 households.17  
 
In order to assess the success of the randomisation, and to compute predicted consumption 
(see section 3), the paper also makes use of data from a Census of all households with women 
of reproductive age, which was conducted by Mai Mwana in 2004, a year before the 
interventions started. This data set has information on basic socio-economic characteristics of 
households such as asset holdings, quality of housing and education levels of women in the 
household.  
4.1 Pre-Intervention Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 displays the pre-intervention (baseline) characteristics of households in our analysis 
sample. Households are large, with just under 6 members on average. Housing conditions are 
poor, as demonstrated by the roofing and flooring materials. Less than 6% of households 
have access to piped water and less than 1% have access to electricity. Among assets, most 
households own a paraffin lamp, 64% own a radio, and 52% own a bicycle. Ownership of 
other assets such as cars, motorbikes and oxcarts is very low. Almost all households are 
involved in agriculture. 
Table 1: Baseline Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Main flooring material: dirt, sand or dung  0.907  0.291 
Main roofing material: natural   0.857  0.350 
Agricultural Household (yes=1)  0.991  0.093 
Traditional pit toilet (yes = 1)  0.802  0.398 
Piped water (yes=1)  0.056  0.229 
# of hh members  5.891  2.480 
# of sleeping rooms  2.207  1.024 
Household has electricity (yes=1)  0.005  0.069 
Household has radio (yes=1)  0.641  0.480 
Household has bicycle (yes=1)  0.523  0.500 
Household has motorcycle (yes=1)  0.007  0.083 
Household has car (yes=1)  0.004  0.060 
Household has paraffin lamp (yes=1)  0.950  0.218 
Household has oxcart (yes=1)  0.051  0.220 
N  2,728   
      
   Notes to table: Source: 2004 Mai Mwana Census Data. 
                                                            
17 We note that the likelihood of being dropped from the sample is not a function of whether or not a crop loss 
was experienced in the first wave, and this statement is true across all intervention and control areas. 
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4.2 Sample Balance 
Next, we check for the success of the random allocation of the interventions across zones, by 
comparing the means of available pre-intervention observable characteristics between the 
treatment zones and the control zone for each of the different treatment arms. Table 2 
presents the results of this comparison. Overall, the sample is well-balanced.  Though there 
are a handful of differences in household-level characteristics between the women’s group 
only zones and the control zones, and between the infant feeding only zones and the control 
zones, the differences are very low, and none are significant at or below the 5% level. 
. 
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Table 2: Sample Balance 
  
Control 
Group   
Difference 
WG Only - 
Control  p-value   
Difference 
IFC Only - 
Control p-value   
Difference 
BOTH - 
Control p-value 
Household Characteristics           
Main Flooring Material: dirt, sand or dung 0.920  ‐0.011 0.631  ‐0.019 0.562  ‐0.025 0.495 
Main roofing Material: natural  0.864  ‐0.015 0.594  ‐0.01 0.815  ‐0.005 0.909 
Agricultural Household (yes=1) 0.994  0.003 0.462  0.003 0.513  ‐0.017 0.15 
Traditional pit toilet (yes = 1) 0.791  ‐0.007 0.875  0.053 0.231  0.001 0.981 
Piped water (yes=1) 0.012  0.107 0.237  0.032 0.33  0.038 0.39 
# of hh members 5.948  ‐0.265 0.065  0.037 0.92  ‐0.009 0.963 
# of sleeping rooms 2.174  ‐0.037 0.716  0.124 0.203  0.042 0.692 
Household has electricity (yes=1) 0.003  ‐0.001 0.551  0.003 0.454  0.006 0.469 
Household has radio (yes=1) 0.662  ‐0.047 0.156  ‐0.005 0.88  ‐0.033 0.322 
Household has bicycle (yes=1) 0.522  ‐0.006 0.879  ‐0.004 0.931  0.013 0.713 
Household has motorcycle (yes=1) 0.007  0 0.978  0 0.998  ‐0.002 0.677 
Household has car (yes=1) 0.007  ‐0.006 0.058  ‐0.006 0.054  ‐0.003 0.364 
Household has paraffin lamp (yes=1) 0.947  0.007 0.773  0.012 0.58  ‐0.006 0.801 
Household has oxcart (yes=1) 0.059  ‐0.011 0.45  ‐0.024 0.059  0.002 0.863 
 Sample Observations 678   666     679     706   
Notes to Table: * indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level. Note that standard errors are clustered at the zone level when 
computing the p-values. The results of the t-tests are also robust to the wild cluster bootstrap-t method recommended by Cameron et al (2007), which is shown to 
perform well when the number of clusters is below 30.   
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4.3 Measuring Consumption 
Our measures of consumption merit in-depth discussion. The survey contained an extensive 
consumption module, asking respondents to report, at the household level, the quantity 
consumed and purchased, and the amount spent on the purchase, of 25 different food items in 
the week prior to the interview. It also elicited expenditures on other important household 
items including clothing, health, education, and housing improvements, among others. The 
latter items were collected for recall periods of 1 month (for items such as fuel, utilities and 
transport), 12 months/since the last survey (9-11 months) (for items such as house 
improvements, clothing, health, and education expenditures). Further, food prices were 
collected from the local markets and trading centres most regularly visited by our sample of 
households. These food price surveys were administered multiple times over the survey 
period, in order to reduce seasonality issues. In the 2009-10 survey, information was also 
collected on conversion units, allowing us to convert non-standard units of measurements 
(such as a cup of beans) to standard units of measurement (such as kilograms and grams).  
 
Total household food consumption is computed by aggregating expenditures on food and the 
imputed values of non-purchased food. We employ the following procedure to value food 
that was not purchased: we first use the conversion units collected in 2009-10 to convert 
foods measured in non-standard units into standard units. Then, we use median unit-values 
(computed by dividing expenditure on a certain good by the quantity purchased, and taking 
the median at the zone and district levels) to value this non-purchased consumption. An 
alternative method is to use the market prices. This is not our preferred method, since most 
households rarely purchase the foods they commonly consume from the markets, and so we 
may over-value their consumption this way. Reassuringly though, valuing consumption by 
either method yields the same food consumption share of total non-durable consumption of 
0.86. 
 
Total non-durable consumption is computed by converting all consumption and expenditure 
values into monthly terms and adding them together. The average monthly food consumption 
for households in our sample is about 10,570 MK (~US$75), while average total monthly 
non-durable consumption is 12,600MK (~US$90).  
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4.4 Measuring Adverse Events 
We next describe the incidence of crop losses in the survey (post-intervention) data. This is a 
key variable in the paper. A large literature considers the effect of such adverse events on 
consumption smoothing, the idea being that under complete insurance, they should have no 
effect on household consumption, but that as one moves away from full insurance, they are 
likely to affect household consumption.  
 
Information on crop losses was collected from two questions within an extensive module on 
adverse events. In the first wave, households were asked whether they had experienced a crop 
loss in the year prior to the survey. If yes, households were asked to report the size (severity) 
of the crop loss, in terms of the estimated income loss associated with it. The second wave of 
data collection asked the same questions, but the recall period related to the time since the 
previous survey, between 9-11 months for most households.  
 
Table 3 displays the prevalence and severity of crop losses in our sample. The top panel 
shows the incidence and size of crop loss events when data from both rounds are pooled, 
while the bottom two panels show the incidence and severity for each round of data 
collection.  
Table 3: Incidence and severity of crop loss 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Aggregating waves 1 and 2 
Crop loss in past 12 months/ since last survey (yes=1) 5,454 0.314 0.464 
Size of crop loss (1000’s MK) 5,364 4.305 14.687 
    
Wave =1    
Crop loss in past 12 months (yes=1) 2,730 0.396 0.489 
Size of crop loss (1000’s MK) 2,668 6.139 19.120 
    
Wave = 2    
Crop loss since first wave (yes=1) 2,724 0.231 0.421 
Size of crop loss (1000’s MK) 2,696 2.489 7.799 
    
Notes to table: Extreme outlying values for the size of the crop loss are dropped.  
Size of crop loss includes zeroes for households that did not experience a crop loss. 
 
On average across both waves, 31% of households report having experienced a crop loss. 
There is substantial variation in the incidence of crop loss, as can be seen from the standard 
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deviations in the table. The average income lost is almost 4,305 MK (approximately $31)18, 
which, at 40% of average monthly consumption, masks a lot of variation. Among those 
households that were hit by a crop loss, the average crop loss is 14,253 MK (~US$102), 
which corresponds to just over one month of average monthly consumption for households in 
the sample.  
 
Disaggregating by wave highlights differences in the incidence of crop loss events and the 
size of the crop loss between waves, with a substantially higher incidence and size of crop 
loss in the first wave compared to the second. This is most likely for two reasons. First, the 
incidence of crop losses in the second wave relates to a shorter period of 9 to 11 months (as 
opposed to 12 months). Second, data collection in the second (first) wave took place during 
(after) the main growing season, and so not all crop losses would have been realised by the 
time of the interview. Note that we control for the differing recall periods throughout the 
empirical work.  
 
For the empirical tests, it is crucial that crop losses represent idiosyncratic (household-level) 
and not aggregate (village-level) adverse events. Crop losses could affect all households in a 
village if they are caused by common weather shocks or natural disasters affecting the whole 
village. To assess this, Figure 1 contains a histogram of the village level variance of the 
incidence of crop losses in our sample.  
 
                                                            
18 The exchange rate at the time of data collection was approximately 140MK = $1. 
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Figure 1: Histogram of proportion of households with crop losses in village 
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The left (right) panel of the figure shows the density of the village level variance of the 
incidence of crop losses in the first (second) wave. Both show substantial variation within the 
village in the incidence of crop losses, though there are some villages where no household 
experienced a crop loss and others where all households experienced a crop loss.  
 
Reassuringly, this variation does not simply reflect variation in the distribution of 
occupations across villages, as can be seen in Figure 2, which plots village level variance of 
the incidence of crop losses among households where the head or spouse report agriculture as 
their main income generating activity.  
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Figure 2: Histogram of proportion of households with crop losses in village among 
agricultural households 
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In any event, we note that we net out the effect of any aggregate (village-wide) events by 
controlling for village-specific dummies in the estimation, so the crop loss picks up the 
effects conditional on this. 
 
5.	Results	
We next turn to the main findings of the paper, as estimated from the specifications described 
in section 3. We first report results pooling all treatments, and then when we allow for 
heterogeneous effects by type of intervention.  
5.1	Pooling	Treatments	
Table 4 displays the results pooling together all three treatments (WG, IFC, BOTH). The first 
three columns present results for the specification with a CARA utility function (consumption 
in levels), while the next three columns present the results for the specification with a CRRA 
utility function (consumption in logs). The dependent variable relates to total household non-
durable consumption.  
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The Table reveals strong evidence of consumption smoothing in intervention villages: indeed, 
the figures in the Table suggest that households living in villages in intervention zones are 
managing to completely protect their consumption against the vagaries of crop losses. This 
finding is particularly strong for the ‘severity’ measure of crop losses, as can be seen from 
Columns [2], [3], [5] and [6]. For instance, we see from Column [2] that for every additional 
1,000 Kwacha (MK) lost due to the crop loss, consumption growth decreases by 43.5 MK. 
However, in villages where the intervention is in place, the decrease in consumption growth 
is almost completely offset (42.05 MK).  From this evidence it appears that community-based 
interventions can help households to completely smooth even fairly large crop losses. This 
finding remains when we consider consumption in logs as opposed to levels, as in Column 
[5] of the Table: the consumption growth rate is protected in intervention areas after the crop 
loss, whereas it is significantly reduced in non-intervention (control) areas.  
 
The result is also robust to the second measure of intensity used, in which the size of the crop 
loss is measured as a proportion of household resources (as measured by predicted 
consumption - see section 3), as can be seen for both consumption levels and logs, in 
Columns [3] and [6] respectively. Finally, Columns [1] and [4] show the effects for the 
incidence of a crop loss, as opposed to intensity. Whilst the general picture remains the same, 
the findings are not significant at conventional levels. This suggests that the crop loss dummy 
variable (the one most commonly used in the literature) is a rather blunt measure of the 
adverse event, and data on its severity is considerably more informative.  
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Table 4: Consumption smoothing, pooling treatments, household non-durable consumption 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
VARIABLES  ΔCONS  ΔCONS  ΔCONS  ΔLN(CONS)  ΔLN(CONS)  ΔLN(CONS) 
             
Δcrop  ‐1847      ‐0.0961*     
  [1188]      [0.053]     
Δcrop*treat  2569**      0.131**     
  [1217]      [0.058]     
Δcrop loss size    ‐43.48**      ‐0.00240***   
    [20.8]      [0.00067]   
Δcrop loss size*treat    42.05*      0.00230***   
    [23.3]      [0.00086]   
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted cons)      ‐889986*      ‐46.81*** 
      [451844]      [12.8] 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*treat      886628*      45.47*** 
      [469337]      [14.7] 
             
Observations  2539  2456  2447  2539  2456  2447 
R‐squared  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.39  0.39  0.39 
                                        Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. All regressions include controls for  
                                        household demographics (changes in number of household members aged under 6, 6-12 years, 12-18 years and over 18),  
                                        seasonality and village fixed effects. 
                                       ‘Cons’ is shorthand for total household non-durable consumption in the past month, measured as detailed in section 4.3. 
                                       Crop loss size is the monetary loss (in Malawian Kwacha) associated with the crop loss - section 4.4.  
                                       Crop loss size/predicted cons is a measure of the relative importance of the loss to the household  - section 4.4. 
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Table 5 presents the results for total household food consumption. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those just reported for household non-durable consumption. 
Households reduce food consumption in order to deal with more severe crop losses, and 
community-based interventions appear to aid households in protecting their food 
consumption, as evidenced from the positive coefficients on the interaction terms. All 
coefficients on the interaction terms have the expected sign and are statistically significant in 
most specifications. Finally note that, as for non-durable consumption, the larger the crop 
loss, the more likely it is that risk sharing takes place – the more blunt measure of a crop loss, 
the dummy variable as to whether or not one occurred, appears to mask this. 
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Table 5: Consumption smoothing, pooled treatments, household food consumption 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
VARIABLES  ΔCONS  ΔCONS  ΔCONS  ΔLN(CONS) ΔLN(CONS)  ΔLN(CONS) 
             
Δcrop  ‐1683      ‐0.101*     
  [1030]      [0.058]     
Δcrop*treat  2299**      0.136**     
  [1061]      [0.062]     
Δcrop loss size    ‐29.51      ‐0.00193***   
    [20.1]      [0.00065]   
Δcrop loss size*treat    28.42      0.00182**   
    [21.5]      [0.00089]   
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted cons)      ‐631301      ‐38.87*** 
      [433573]      [14.5] 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*treat      618587      36.76** 
      [442240]      [16.4] 
             
Observations  2539  2456  2447  2537  2454  2445 
R‐squared  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.38  0.38  0.38 
                                   Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. All regressions include controls for household 
                                  demographics (changes in number of household members aged under 6, 6-12 years, 12-18 years and over 18), seasonality and  
                                   village fixed effects. 
                                   ‘Cons’ is shorthand for total household food consumption in the past month, measured as detailed in section 4.3. 
                                   Crop loss size is the monetary loss (in Malawian Kwacha) associated with the crop loss - section 4.4.  
                                   Crop loss size/predicted cons is a measure of the relative importance of the loss to the household  - section 4.4. 
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5.2	By	Treatment	Type	
The discussion in section 2.4 suggests that different community-based interventions have 
potentially different effects on consumption smoothing. Some interventions could help 
overcome certain barriers to risk sharing such as imperfect information and limited 
commitment. Interventions such as the women’s groups can engender co-operation within the 
community and hence improve consumption smoothing by reducing the incidence and 
severity of adverse events. Hence, the type of community intervention may matter for 
consumption smoothing. 
 
To investigate whether this is the case, Tables 6 and 7 present results from specifications that 
allow for heterogeneous effects of the different interventions on consumption smoothing. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms for the different interventions are very similar (and 
cannot be statistically distinguished to be different) for all outcomes and measures of crop 
losses. Therefore, the two different community interventions and the interaction of these two 
result in similar levels of consumption smoothing following a crop loss. 
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Table 6: Consumption smoothing, by Intervention, household non-durable consumption 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
VARIABLES  ΔCONS  ΔCONS  ΔCONS  ΔLN(CONS)  ΔLN(CONS)  ΔLN(CONS) 
             
Δcrop  ‐1849      ‐0.0959*     
  [1190]      [0.053]     
Δcrop*WG  2393*      0.151*     
  [1413]      [0.080]     
Δcrop*IFC  2870**      0.121*     
  [1267]      [0.063]     
Δcrop*BOTH   2480*      0.124**     
  [1261]      [0.059]     
Δcrop loss size    ‐43.45**      ‐0.0024***   
    [20.8]      [0.0006]   
Δcrop loss size*WG    30.02      0.0013   
    [22.6]      [0.0007]   
Δcrop loss size*IFC    43.24      0.0026***   
    [27.8]      [0.0009]   
Δcrop loss size*BOTH    53.96*      0.0029**   
    [28.6]      [0.0012]   
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted cons)      ‐889526*      ‐46.75*** 
      [452200]      [12.8] 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*WG      778209      35.42** 
      [474180]      [13.9] 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*IFC      900793*      50.23*** 
      [515879]      [16.1] 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*BOTH      1026214*     54.53*** 
      [519879]      [18.7] 
Constant  1373**  1262**  1291**  0.125***  0.121**  0.122*** 
  [538]  [545]  [538]  [0.044]  [0.045]  [0.045] 
             
Observations  2539  2456  2447  2539  2456  2447 
R‐squared  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.39  0.39  0.39 
Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. All regressions include 
controls for household demographics (changes in number of household members aged under 6, 6-12 years, 12-
18 years and over 18), seasonality and village fixed effects. 
‘Cons’ is shorthand for total household non-durable consumption in the past month, measured as detailed in 
section 4.3. 
Crop loss size is the monetary loss (in Malawian Kwacha) associated with the crop loss – section 4.4.  
Crop loss size/predicted cons is a measure of the relative importance of the loss to the household  - section 4.4. 
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Table 7: Consumption smoothing, by Intervention, household food consumption 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
VARIABLES  ΔCONS  ΔCONS  ΔCONS  ΔLN(CONS)  ΔLN(CONS)  ΔLN(CONS) 
             
Δcrop  ‐1686      ‐0.101*     
  [1032]      [0.058]     
Δcrop*WG  1940      0.157*     
  [1189]      [0.080]     
Δcrop*IFC  2628**      0.120*     
  [1127]      [0.070]     
Δcrop*BOTH  2331**      0.131*     
  [1139]      [0.067]     
Δcrop loss size    ‐29.48      ‐0.00193***   
    [20.1]      [0.00065]   
Δcrop loss size*WG    21.15      0.00094   
    [22.6]      [0.00087]   
Δcrop loss size*IFC    37.93*      0.00270**   
    [20.9]      [0.0011]   
Δcrop loss 
size*BOTH    25.65      0.00178   
    [26.7]      [0.0012]   
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted cons)      ‐630696      ‐38.80** 
      [433869]      [14.5] 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*WG      568238      28.89* 
      [458334]      [16.2] 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*IFC      721132      47.63** 
      [436536]      [18.6] 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)* BOTH      575664      35.85* 
      [490198]      [20.1] 
Constant  1446***  1372***  1402***  0.178***  0.175***  0.177*** 
  [428]  [449]  [438]  [0.042]  [0.042]  [0.042] 
             
Observations  2539  2456  2447  2537  2454  2445 
R‐squared  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.38  0.38  0.38 
Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. All regressions include 
controls for household demographics (changes in number of household members aged under 6, 6-12 years, 12-
18 years and over 18), seasonality and village fixed effects. 
‘Cons’ is shorthand for total household food consumption in the past month, measured as detailed in section 4.3. 
Crop loss size is the monetary loss (in Malawian Kwacha) associated with the crop loss – section 4.4.  
Crop loss size/predicted cons is a measure of the relative importance of the loss to the household  - section 4.4. 
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6.	How	can	Community	Based	Interventions	Improve	Consumption	
Smoothing?		
6.1			Social	Interactions	
In this section, we scrutinise empirically the possible channels highlighted in section 2.4 
regarding how the interventions may improve consumption smoothing. We first examine the 
role of social interactions, which might be associated with risk sharing improvements through 
reductions in asymmetric information and limited commitment. Table 8 shows the results of 
estimating equation (2) but using as the dependent variable, changes in whether the individual 
spoke one-to-one with a relative or friend about selected topics. Though there is some 
variability in the results depending on the topic of the chat and the measure of loss, in general 
we find that individuals living in treatment areas, and who suffered from a crop loss, are more 
likely to talk to a friend or relative compared to individuals living in control area who 
suffered a crop loss. Table 9 shows the results considering the interventions separately. As in 
Table 8, the significance of the results depend on the topic of the chat and the crop loss 
measures, but in general it seems that both IFC and WG help increase the social interactions 
of those who suffered a crop loss. This is agreement with our previous results that both IFC 
and WG contributed in a similar manner to consumption smoothing.  
 
  29
Table 8: Change in the probability of one‐to‐one chats as a function of different measures of crop loss. All interventions pooled.      
Dep vble: change 
in probability of 
one‐to‐one chats 
on    Credit  Politics  Jobs 
 
Children’s 
schooling 
                         
Δcrop  ‐0.059**      ‐0.003      ‐0.018      ‐0.068     
  [0.023]      [0.043]      [0.063]      [0.048]     
                         
Δcrop*treat  0.115***      0.037      0.005      0.096     
  [0.036]      [0.059]      [0.068]      [0.059]     
                         
Δcrop loss size    ‐0.0003      ‐0.002**      ‐0.0001      ‐0.001   
    [0.0004]      [0.001]      [0.0004]      [0.001]   
                         
  0.002      0.002*      0.002**      0.003*   Δcrop loss 
size*treat    [0.002]      [0.001]      [0.001]      [0.002]   
                         
    ‐5.699      ‐33.497**      ‐1.497      ‐24.117 Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)      [9.640]      [13.581]      [11.220]      [20.311] 
                         
    30.108      37.153*      24.125      47.813* Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*treat      [21.382]      [18.523]      [14.461]      [25.375] 
                         
Observations  2596  2513  2447  2593  2510  2445  2595  2512  2446  2593  2510  2444 
Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
  30
 
Table  9: Change in the probability of having one‐to‐one chats as a function of different measures of crop loss, by intervention.       
Dep vble: 
change in 
probability of 
one‐to‐one 
chats on   Credit  Politics  Jobs  Children’s schooling 
                         
Δcrop  ‐0.059**      ‐0.004      ‐0.018      ‐0.069     
  [0.023]      [0.043]      [0.064]      [0.048]     
Δcrop*WG  0.088**      ‐0.061      ‐0.008      0.067     
  [0.042]      [0.052]      [0.088]      [0.069]     
Δcrop*IFC  0.179***      0.097      0.063      0.130     
  [0.0508]      [0.081]      [0.071]      [0.080]     
Δcrop*BOTH  0.086*      0.067      ‐0.030      0.092     
  [0.049]      [0.073]      [0.070]      [0.069]     
Δcrop loss size    ‐0.0003      ‐0.002**      ‐0.0001      ‐0.001   
    [0.0004]      [0.001]      [0.0004]      [0.0007]   
  0.002***      0.001      0.003***      0.004***   Δcrop loss 
size*WG    [0.001]      [0.001]      [0.001]      [0.001]   
  0.0006      0.004**      0.0006      0.001   Δcrop loss 
size*IFC    [0.004]      [0.002]      [0.001]      [0.002]   
  0.003**      0.003      0.002      0.003   Δcrop loss 
size*BOTH    [0.0015]      [0.002]      [0.001]      [0.003]   
                         
Observations  2596  2513    2593  2510    2595  2512    2593  2510   
Table 9 continued overleaf.               
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Table  9 contd.: Change on the probability of having one to one chats as a function of different measures of crop loss,  
by intervention       
Dep vble: 
change in 
probability of 
one‐to‐one 
chats on  
 
 
Credit  Politics  Jobs  Children’s schooling 
    ‐5.750      ‐33.347**      ‐1.595      ‐24.173 Δ(crop loss size/predicted 
cons)      [9.676]      [13.588]      [11.220]      [20.321] 
    31.173**      18.272      35.770**      56.510** Δ(crop loss size/predicted 
cons)*WG      [13.269]      [15.862]      [14.612]      [24.915] 
                         
    18.584      56.506**      10.693      42.112 Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*IFC      [54.206]      [22.544]      [16.657]      [31.265] 
    41.518*      42.516      22.497      41.735 
Δ(crop loss 
size/predicted 
cons)*BOTH      [22.035]      [30.234]      [21.936]      [39.775] 
                         
Observations      2447      2445      2446      2444 
Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
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6.2	Improved	Health	
As discussed in section 2.4, health gains due to the interventions could directly improve 
consumption smoothing, because households living in treatment areas could, for instance, 
smooth their consumption better by working harder, and/or taking on extra work if they are in 
better health. Though this is not what we would expect - the interventions focused 
specifically on reproductive and infant health - it would difficult to rule out a priori spillovers 
on general adult health. To investigate this, Tables 10 and 11 report the effect of the 
interventions on several indicators of adult health, separately for males and females. We also 
display the coefficients on education, which replicate the well-known education gradient in 
reported health: the more educated are significantly less likely to report many of the health 
problems considered. This provides us with considerable confidence in our measures of self-
reported health. According to the results in the Table, there is no evidence that the 
interventions improved adult health in a significant way.19  
 
                                                            
19 The Women’s Group intervention could have reduced maternal mortality, though this is unlikely to explain 
our consumption smoothing results because maternal mortality is 510 per 100,000 live births 
(http://www.childinfo.org/maternal_mortality_countrydata.php). Our sample does not have enough power to  
detect significant differences in maternal mortality.  
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Table 10: Effects of the Interventions on Health for Male Adults 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9] 
VARIABLES 
Diarrhoea 
in last 30 
days 
Fever in last 
30 days 
Cough in 
last 30 days 
Chills in last 
30 days 
Vomiting in 
last 30 days 
Any 
symptom in 
last 30 days 
Unable to 
carry out 
daily 
activities 
Can easily 
carry a load 
of 10 kg for 
20 metres 
Can easily 
walk 5 km 
                   
IFC  ‐0.009  0.076*  0.004  0.026  0.017  0.066  0.083**  ‐0.008  ‐0.062 
  [0.012]  [0.046]  [0.056]  [0.031]  [0.019]  [0.063]  [0.038]  [0.032]  [0.050] 
WG  0.001  0.072*  ‐0.02  0.001  ‐0.017  0.03  0.037  0.024  0.044 
  [0.014]  [0.043]  [0.050]  [0.029]  [0.018]  [0.058]  [0.037]  [0.029]  [0.031] 
BOTH  0.006  0.039  ‐0.04  0.025  0  ‐0.009  0.042  0.02  0.039 
  [0.013]  [0.047]  [0.045]  [0.031]  [0.017]  [0.059]  [0.044]  [0.026]  [0.033] 
Age  0.001**  0.001**  0.001  0.001  0  0.001  0.002***  ‐0.003***  ‐0.005*** 
  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Primary education 1‐3  ‐0.01  0.01  ‐0.005  0.006  ‐0.003  0.001  0.021  0.002  0.01 
  [0.008]  [0.019]  [0.022]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.027]  [0.021]  [0.012]  [0.013] 
Primary education  4‐6  ‐0.007  ‐0.005  ‐0.019  ‐0.003  ‐0.028**  ‐0.035  ‐0.019  0.014  0.007 
  [0.008]  [0.018]  [0.020]  [0.014]  [0.011]  [0.023]  [0.018]  [0.013]  [0.013] 
Secondary education or above  ‐0.020*  ‐0.015  ‐0.053**  ‐0.011  ‐0.032**  ‐0.074**  ‐0.065**  0.019  0.014 
  [0.012]  [0.032]  [0.022]  [0.019]  [0.015]  [0.035]  [0.029]  [0.016]  [0.018] 
                   
Observations  5678  5683  5690  5677  5685  5669  5760  5767  5766 
Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1; Marginal effects from probit models. 
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Table 11: Effects of the Interventions on Health for Female Adults 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9] 
VARIABLES 
Diarrhoea in 
last 30 days 
Fever in 
last 30 days 
Cough in 
last 30 
days 
Chills in 
last 30 
days 
Vomiting in 
last 30 days 
Any 
symptom in 
last 30 days 
Unable to 
carry out 
daily 
activities 
Can easily 
carry a load 
of 10 kg for 
20 metres 
Can easily 
walk 5 km 
                   
IFC  ‐0.008  0.073  ‐0.009  0.007  0.001  0.054  0.058  0.013  ‐0.071 
  [0.012]  [0.047]  [0.053]  [0.043]  [0.035]  [0.055]  [0.044]  [0.036]  [0.053] 
WG  0.007  0.048  0.032  0.004  0.006  0.043  0  0.034  0.024 
  [0.019]  [0.041]  [0.050]  [0.042]  [0.029]  [0.058]  [0.041]  [0.032]  [0.037] 
BOTH  ‐0.003  0.064  0.029  0.048  0.044  0.04  0.028  0.014  0.037 
  [0.018]  [0.049]  [0.050]  [0.047]  [0.029]  [0.063]  [0.043]  [0.034]  [0.035] 
Age  0  0.003***  0  0.001*  ‐0.001**  0.002*  0.003***  ‐0.004***  ‐0.005*** 
  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Primary education 1‐3  0.001  0.021  ‐0.022  ‐0.013  0.035**  0.023  0.02  0.016  0.014 
  [0.010]  [0.023]  [0.021]  [0.019]  [0.015]  [0.025]  [0.024]  [0.017]  [0.015] 
Primary education 4‐6  ‐0.004  ‐0.008  ‐0.013  ‐0.025*  ‐0.003  ‐0.019  ‐0.008  0.038***  0.023* 
  [0.011]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.015]  [0.013]  [0.021]  [0.020]  [0.012]  [0.013] 
Secondary education or above  ‐0.018  ‐0.044  ‐0.043  ‐0.051**  ‐0.037**  ‐0.065**  ‐0.082***  0.040**  0.024 
  [0.014]  [0.030]  [0.029]  [0.025]  [0.015]  [0.033]  [0.030]  [0.017]  [0.019] 
                   
Observations  6,475  6,471  6,477  6,468  6,457  6,459  6,517  6,517  6,518 
Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1; Marginal effects from probit models. 
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Next, we examine the effects of the interventions on child health. Improvements in child 
health could improve consumption smoothing in at least two ways: healthier children require 
less care and free up household labour, and/or households might need to spend less on health 
care and are able to save more, thus facilitating consumption smoothing. Table 12 shows the 
effects of the interventions on child morbidity. There appears to be no significant reduction in 
the probability that a child suffers from diarrhoea, fast breathing or vomiting. Although there 
is no apparent improvement in morbidity, the height of children below 24 months has 
improved due to IFC. In particular, Table 13 shows that IFC improved children’s height, a 
measure of long term health, by 30.4% of one standard deviation.20 However, there are no 
significant improvements in child’s anthropometric outcomes in WG areas. 
 
According to these results, IFC helped families to improve the nutrition of their children. In 
principle, we cannot be certain whether the observed improvement in consumption smoothing 
in IFC areas is due to an improvement in children’s nutritional status rather than reduction in 
asymmetric information or increased enforcement. However, from a purely intuitive point of 
view, it is hard to think that the large improvements in consumption smoothing that we have 
found could be due to an improvement in the nutritional status of young children. To provide 
evidence in this regard, we estimate equation (2) on the sub-sample of households with 
children older than 24 months, for whom no direct health improvements from the 
interventions have been detected. The results, reported in Tables 14 and 15, still show 
evidence of consumption smoothing even among households that did not directly benefit 
from improved child health outcomes through the interventions. All of these pieces of 
evidence put together suggest that health improvements as a result of the interventions are not 
driving the observed improvements in consumption smoothing. 
 
                                                            
20 The dependent variables in Table 13 are height-for-age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-height. Height-for-age 
is built as the difference between a child’s height minus the median height of children of the same age in the 
World Health Organization (WHO) reference population, divided by the standard deviation of height for 
children of the same age in the WHO reference population. The variables weight-for-age and weight-for-height 
are built in a similar manner. The results can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. See 
http://www.who.int/childgrowth/standards/en/ for more information.  
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Table 12. Effect of the interventions on child morbidity.  
Marginal effects using Probit models 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
VARIABLES 
Diarrhoea 
0‐24 mths 
Diarrhoea 
24‐48 
mths 
Fast 
Breathing 
0‐24 mths 
Fast 
Breathing24‐
48 mths 
Vomiting 
0‐24 mths 
Vomiting 
24‐48 mths 
             
IFC  ‐0.009  0.076*  0.004  0.026  0.017  0.066 
  [0.012]  [0.046]  [0.056]  [0.031]  [0.019]  [0.063] 
WG  0.001  0.072*  ‐0.02  0.001  ‐0.017  0.03 
  [0.014]  [0.043]  [0.050]  [0.029]  [0.018]  [0.058] 
BOTH  0.006  0.039  ‐0.04  0.025  0  ‐0.009 
  [0.013]  [0.047]  [0.045]  [0.031]  [0.017]  [0.059] 
Age  0.001**  0.001**  0.001  0.001  0  0.001 
  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001] 
Primary educ 1‐3  ‐0.01  0.01  ‐0.005  0.006  ‐0.003  0.001 
  [0.008]  [0.019]  [0.022]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.027] 
Primary educ 4‐6  ‐0.007  ‐0.005  ‐0.019  ‐0.003  ‐0.028**  ‐0.035 
  [0.008]  [0.018]  [0.020]  [0.014]  [0.011]  [0.023] 
‐0.020*  ‐0.015  ‐0.053**  ‐0.011  ‐0.032**  ‐0.074** Secondary educ or 
more  [0.012]  [0.032]  [0.022]  [0.019]  [0.015]  [0.035] 
             
Observations  2,709  2,722  2,711  2,719  2,707  2,726 
Clustered standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13. Effect of the interventions in child's anthropometrics  
(measured in standard deviations) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
VARIABLES 
Height‐
for‐age,   
0‐24 
mths 
Height‐
for‐age,    
24‐48 
mths 
Weight‐
for‐age,   
0‐24 
mths 
Weight 
for age,    
24‐48 
mths 
Weight‐
for‐
height,    
0‐24 mths 
Weight‐
for‐
height,    
24‐48 
mths 
             
IFC  0.304**  0.123  ‐0.0501  0.0246  ‐0.376**  ‐0.0882 
  [0.137]  [0.120]  [0.0953] [0.126]  [0.149]  [0.117] 
WG  0.0727  0.0819  ‐0.0808  0.0433  ‐0.263**  ‐0.0706 
  [0.174]  [0.121]  [0.107]  [0.101]  [0.121]  [0.110] 
BOTH  0.298**  0.234*  ‐0.0096  0.0894  ‐0.295*  ‐0.105 
  [0.136]  [0.118]  [0.0973] [0.107]  [0.149]  [0.0995] 
Primary educ 1‐3  ‐0.037  ‐0.245**  0.0257  ‐0.107  0.0444  ‐0.0243 
  [0.119]  [0.118]  [0.0874] [0.0816]  [0.0948]  [0.0747] 
Primary educ 4‐6  ‐0.123  ‐0.0104  0.12  0.0581  0.179**  0.07 
  [0.105]  [0.111]  [0.0876] [0.0894]  [0.0807]  [0.0625] 
0.0281  0.349**  0.372**  0.338*** 0.396**  0.14 Secondary educ or 
more  [0.141]  [0.141]  [0.166]  [0.107]  [0.153]  [0.105] 
             
Observations  2,431  2,440  2,538  2,491  2,476  2,447 
Clustered standard errors in brackets.          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Table 14. Consumption Smoothing, by intervention.  
Households without children younger than 24 months 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
VARIABLES  Δtot_cons  Δtot_cons Δtot_cons  Δltot_cons Δltot_cons  Δltot_cons
             
Δcrop  ‐2,039**      ‐0.147**     
  [911.8]      [0.0604]     
Δcrop*WG  2,311      0.248*     
  [1,841]      [0.138]     
Δcrop*IFC  3,612**      0.208**     
  [1,420]      [0.0925]     
Δcrop*BOTH  4,265***      0.247**     
  [1,481]      [0.0950]     
Δinc_crop    ‐63.09*     
‐
0.00573***   
    [37.49]      [0.00209]   
Δinc_crop*WG    114.2      0.00897**   
    [69.84]      [0.00432]   
Δinc_crop*IFC    144.0**      0.0105***   
    [60.01]      [0.00346]   
Δinc_crop*BOTH  26.17      0.00511**   
    [50.69]      [0.00252]   
Δshare      ‐708,154*      ‐64.26** 
      [354,340]      [27.90] 
Δshare*WG      1,532,000***      109.7** 
      [559,703]      [41.93] 
Δshare*IFC      1,849,000***      128.6*** 
      [620,882]      [41.75] 
Δshare* BOTH      181,435      56.4 
      [617,023]      [35.10] 
Constant  1,546**  1,560**  1,705**  0.126*  0.136**  0.141** 
  [753.0]  [715.8]  [707.7]  [0.0649]  [0.0638]  [0.0639] 
             
Observations  1,089  1,052  1,050  1,089  1,052  1,050 
R‐squared  0.483  0.483  0.486  0.549  0.549  0.55 
Robust standard errors in brackets.         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *<0.1           
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Table 15. Consumption Smoothing (Food), by intervention. 
Households without children younger than 24 months 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
VARIABLES  Δtot_cons  Δtot_cons Δtot_cons  Δltot_cons Δltot_cons  Δltot_cons
             
Δcrop  ‐1,393*      ‐0.106*     
  [765.5]      [0.0616]     
Δcrop*WG  1,509      0.216     
  [1,600]      [0.147]     
Δcrop*IFC  2,767**      0.160*     
  [1,232]      [0.0950]     
Δcrop*BOTH  3,722**      0.239**     
  [1,470]      [0.0957]     
Δinc_crop    ‐25.48      ‐0.00249   
    [31.98]      [0.00289]   
Δinc_crop*WG    62.74      0.00629   
    [69.00]      [0.00601]   
Δinc_crop*IFC    81.99*      0.00623   
    [42.70]      [0.00397]   
Δinc_crop*BOTH  ‐19.02      0.0027   
    [45.86]      [0.00309]   
Δshare      ‐246,882      ‐27.23 
      [353,309]      [38.90] 
Δshare*WG      954,043      83.98 
      [610,272]      [59.95] 
Δshare*IFC      1.055e+06**     77.21 
      [498,768]      [50.25] 
Δshare* BOTH      ‐370,042      32.01 
      [599,708]      [43.22] 
Constant  1,904***  1,799***  1,950***  0.206***  0.215***  0.221*** 
  [597.6]  [544.2]  [530.9]  [0.0663]  [0.0663]  [0.0664] 
             
Observations  1,089  1,052  1,050  1,088  1,051  1,049 
R‐squared  0.483  0.482  0.484  0.539  0.539  0.54 
Robust standard errors in brackets.         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1           
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6.3	Reduced	prevalence	and/or	severity	of	adverse	events	
Another way in which the interventions could improve consumption smoothing is by 
reducing the incidence of crop losses in the first place. We test whether this is true 
empirically using the following specification: 
   (3) 
where cropt represents, at time t, the incidence of the adverse event and its severity as 
measured by income loss and the other variables are as defined in section 3. If the reduced 
prevalence and/or severity story is the relevant one here, we would expect  to be negative 
and statistically significant from zero. We estimate specification (3) using ordinary least 
squares, clustering standard errors at the level of the zone. Table 16 displays the results for 
waves 1 and 2 separately.  
Table 16: Incidence and Intensity of Crop Losses, Pooled 
  Wave 1  Wave 2 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
VARIABLE  Crop loss  Crop loss size  Crop loss  Crop loss size 
         
Treat  0.117  1.37  0.0591  0.627 
  [0.091]  [1.68]  [0.059]  [0.84] 
Constant  0.308***  5.124***  0.186*** 2.008*** 
  [0.077]  [1.39]  [0.044]  [0.70] 
Observations  2726  2664  2713  2686 
R‐squared  0.01  0  0  0 
          Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
From the Table, we see that all of the coefficients are greater than zero and are statistically 
insignificant from zero, suggesting that reduced prevalence/severity is not driving the 
improvement in consumption smoothing.  
 
Next, we check whether this conclusion holds when we allow for different effects for the 
different interventions. We estimate equation 4 below 
        (4) 
where the variables are defined as before. Table 17 below displays the results for waves 1 and 
2 separately. As above, none of the coefficients are negative and all but one is statistically 
significant from zero, confirming that reduced prevalence/severity of adverse events is not 
driving consumption smoothing.  
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Table 17: Incidence and Intensity of Crop Loss Shocks, by treatment 
  Wave 1  Wave 2 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
VARIABLE  Crop loss  Crop loss size  Crop loss Crop loss size 
         
IFC  0.0793  1.743  0.0525  0.706 
  [0.12]  [2.45]  [0.087]  [1.16] 
WG  0.0746  0.645  0.0617  0.255 
  [0.11]  [2.04]  [0.073]  [0.93] 
BOTH  0.193*  1.711  0.0629  0.901 
  [0.099]  [1.92]  [0.083]  [1.10] 
Constant  0.308***  5.124***  0.186*** 2.008*** 
  [0.078]  [1.39]  [0.044]  [0.70] 
Observations  2726  2664  2713  2686 
R‐squared  0.02  0  0  0 
Notes to table: Clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
7.	Policy	Implications	
In this section, we summarise the most salient policy implications of our findings. The first 
implication is that community-based interventions aimed at improving health can in fact also 
aid households in smoothing consumption. This appears to be due to the increased social 
interactions fostered by such interventions, particularly among communities exposed to a 
participatory intervention. In particular, the participatory groups seem to provide an 
important source of information on obtaining credit for households hit by a crop loss. 
A note of caution is in order though. The effects estimated in this paper may not generalise to 
all community-based interventions. The design of the intervention and the coverage of 
beneficiaries matters. For instance, there is evidence that external aid can leave community 
groups vulnerable to elite capture problems, where the elite are arguably among those who 
are already well able to smooth their consumption (Gugerty and Kremer, 2008). Other 
potential factors to consider are whether the groups are pre-existing or newly-formed, the 
duration of the intervention, how participatory it is, as well as the benefits of participating in 
the intervention. 
8.	Conclusion		
Using a two wave panel collected in rural Malawi within a cluster randomised trial of two 
community interventions, we find, first of all, that households are not fully insured against 
crop losses. More interestingly, we find evidence that community interventions greatly 
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improve households’ consumption smoothing possibilities. Indeed, the evidence is strong, 
with potential losses to consumption due to crop losses being completely offset in 
intervention areas. 
 
We investigate three channels through which community interventions may have improved 
consumption smoothing. We can rule out that the interventions improved general adult health 
in a significant way, as well as that crop losses are simply less severe in intervention areas. 
Whilst we cannot rule out that the improvement in consumption smoothing could be due, at 
least partially, to improvements in child’s health in IFC areas, this channel does not seem to 
have been important in WG areas. Of the channels that we investigate, increases in social 
interactions seem to play an important role in explaining consumption smoothing.  
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APPENDIX 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 What is consumption smoothing? 
Consumption smoothing refers to the process of protecting living standards (as measured by 
consumption) from fluctuations in income. In rural areas of developing countries, where risk 
is very prevalent and shocks can have disastrous consequences, consumption smoothing is 
particularly important. Not only does failing to smooth consumption has direct negative 
consequences on welfare but it also affects productivity because forward-looking households 
who are unable to effectively smooth consumption will choose production methods, 
activities, and investments (including human capital investments) that are less risky even if 
they yield lower returns (Morduch, 1995).    
 
Important workhorse models in economics (permanent income hypothesis (Friedman (1957), 
the life cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954)) all predict that individuals and 
households prefer to smooth their consumption across time and states of the world. In 
particular, the permanent income hypothesis predicts that individuals and households will 
save transitory shocks to their incomes and only spend permanent shocks to their incomes. 
Similarly, the life cycle hypothesis model derives the prediction that economic agents with a 
utility function that is concave in consumption will want a smooth consumption stream across 
time and across states of the world (by states of the world we mean for instance “good” times 
and “bad” times).  
 
An implicit assumption in the derivation of these predictions relates to the available markets. 
In the presence of complete markets (in which agents can trade claims for any possible state 
of the world), agents will be able to smooth consumption across states (as well as time) and 
thus perfectly insure consumption (Diamond (1967)). In other words, in the presence of 
complete markets, agents can use instruments such as savings, credit and insurance to protect 
their consumption against shocks. However, if markets are not complete, consumption may 
not be fully insured.  
1.2 How is consumption smoothing achieved in developing countries: What is informal 
risk sharing? 
 
As mentioned above, under the assumption of complete markets, economic agents have 
available effective instruments such as savings, credit and insurance instruments to fully 
smooth their consumption. However, in rural areas of developing countries, fully functioning 
credit and insurance markets are generally unavailable. Furthermore, government institutions 
are usually weak, making it virtually impossible to write contracts that would be enforceable 
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in a court of law to deal with risk. In such environments, households turn to numerous 
informal institutions and instruments to cope with the consequences of risk21.  
It is important to differentiate between measures taken to reduce the amount of risk faced, 
and measures employed to cope with the consequences of risk. The former include strategies 
such as diversification of income streams, choosing technologies yielding a safe return and 
adoption of preventive health behaviours, among others. These reduce the probability of 
occurrence of adverse events, but at the expense of lower future returns on investments 
(Morduch, 1995). The latter – informal instruments and institutions used to cope with the 
consequences of risk - are referred to as informal risk sharing. Besley (1995a) provides a 
comprehensive review of the different types of commonly used informal institutions and 
tools. These include informal credit and insurance arrangements, rotating savings and credit 
associations, informal transfers and gifts in networks of friends and family, credit co-
operatives, inter-linked transactions, and saving amongst others.  
While households can save, the available savings instruments are highly imperfect: Financial 
instruments such as bank accounts are rarely available, and if available, may be too expensive 
to maintain; excess grain that is stored may rot or be destroyed by pests while money stored 
under the mattress is vulnerable to theft and inflation. Assets including livestock could be 
considered to be a store of value and can be liquidated in case of adverse shocks, including 
aggregate shocks, as shown by Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1993) and Czukas, Fafchamps and 
Udry (1998).  
A vital consideration though is that the instruments used for informal risk sharing are more 
effective in protecting consumption against idiosyncratic shocks, rather than aggregate 
shocks. For instance, livestock may be worthless in the case of aggregate shocks due to 
general equilibrium effects: If all households in a community choose to sell their livestock to 
cope with an adverse aggregate shock, in the absence of sufficient buyers, the price of 
livestock will fall and so this form of saving will be ineffective. This has been documented in 
the case of Burkina Faso by Kazianga and Udry (2006). Other instruments may also become 
ineffective in the face of an aggregate shock: Households cannot rely of informal gifts, loans 
or transfers from friends and neighbours, since they are also in need of help! 
1.3 How efficient is informal risk sharing in smoothing consumption?  
 
We now turn to assessing the effectiveness of these institutions and tools in smoothing 
household consumption. The literature focuses primarily on assessing the efficiency of 
                                                            
21 When considering the risk faced by economic agents in such environments, it is crucial to distinguish 
between idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. Idiosyncratic risk refers to risk experienced by random members of a 
community. Aggregate risk, however, affects all members of a community. Note that aggregate risk could 
interact with idiosyncratic risk in determining the wellbeing of the agent. For example, death of a household 
member affects one household only within a community (idiosyncratic shock), but a drought would affect all 
households in the community (aggregate shock), but could have more drastic consequences for the household 
that experienced the death.  
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informal risk sharing strategies in smoothing consumption. The main approach taken in the 
literature is a competitive equilibrium approach, in that testable implications are derived from 
models where the budget constraint of the economy is taken into consideration. Moreover, 
the testable implications are agnostic to the particular methods used to share risk and instead 
test the effectiveness of all employed methods without knowledge about the individual 
methods (Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994)). The following subsection 
explores in detail the construction of the main tests and summarises the results in the 
literature. 
1.3.1 How tests are constructed in the literature, Evidence and Further Refinements 
 
Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994) developed similar tests, which we 
outline below. The derivation here closely follows that by Townsend (1994) who obtains 
testable implications from the first order conditions of a dynamic programming problem in 
which a hypothetical social planner maximises the weighted sum of agents22 expected utilities 
subject to village resource constraints. Townsend assumes a Constant Absolute Risk 
Aversion (CARA) form for the utility function representing individual preferences, while 
Mace also derives testable implications with a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) 
utility function. The consumption process implied by full risk sharing with CARA 
preferences is as follows: 
            (1) 
where  is the consumption of household j in village v at time t, Cvt is average consumption 
in the community at time t,  are demographic variables for household j,  are other 
time varying household variables and  is a disturbance term. The household specific fixed 
term, , is not observed and can be eliminated by differencing equation (1) over time, 
which yields the following equation: 
      (2) 
In essence, under full risk sharing the consumption process is such that any changes in 
household consumption can be explained by changes (or shocks) to aggregate consumption 
and changes in household demographic variables. Therefore, one test for perfect risk sharing 
is to include in equation (2) a variable indicating a preference shock or an income shock (that 
we denote by ∆yjt). The specification for this test is as below: 
      (3) 
                                                            
22 Cochrane (1990) and Mace (1991) both take the household to be the economic agent, while Townsend 
(1994) considers individuals as the relevant economic agents. Townsend then aggregates individuals to the 
household level. For simplicity, we will assume that the agent here is the household.  
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If there is perfect risk sharing, the coefficient θ should equal 0. Moreover, as done in 
Townsend (1994) θ can be interpreted as a measure of the effectiveness of risk sharing 
arrangements, with a value close to 0 indicating that consumption is almost fully protected 
from idiosyncratic shocks. Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) apply this test on US data, 
while Townsend (1994) applies it to data from 4 Indian villages. He obtains a value of 0.14 
for θ, which, though significantly different from zero, suggests that there is a substantial 
amount of risk sharing taking place among these households.  A key feature of this test (and a 
possible drawback) is that it identifies the efficiency of risk sharing for idiosyncratic shocks 
only and not for aggregate shocks, so that even if households are insured substantially against 
idiosyncratic shocks, they may not be insured against aggregate shocks, which may hamper 
consumption smoothing.  
Two criticisms have been levelled against the above test specification. First, as mentioned by 
Chauduri and Ravallion (1998), consumption and income are measured with error in most 
datasets. This measurement error is of the classical form, which will attenuate regression 
coefficients.  Therefore, coefficient estimates for θ may be close to 0 as a result of errors in 
measurement rather than households being fairly well insured. This problem can be overcome 
by employing the instrumental variables approach, using an instrument for income.  A 
second, more fundamental problem with specification (3) is also highlighted by the same 
authors: This specification does not allow for a complete separation in the aggregate and 
idiosyncratic components of income changes. Δyjt therefore is a noisy measure of 
idiosyncratic income shocks, which can thereby lead to attenuation bias in θ when θ>0.  
Chauduri and Ravallion (1998) therefore suggest implementing the following test 
implemented by Cochrane (1991), which modifies specification (3) by including village-time 
dummies in place of . The modified specification is as follows:  
   (4) 
Where  are village-time dummies and θ is interpreted as before. The main test of the theory 
in this specification is that θ should equal zero in the presence of perfect risk sharing. 
Chauduri and Ravallion (1998) estimate (4) using the same data as Townsend and employing 
instrumental variables to correct for the endogeneity introduced by measurement error in 
income. Making these adjustments yields a higher coefficient for θ than that obtained by 
Townsend. The conclusion is still the same: consumption is not fully insured. 
If one assumes that consumption preferences are better described by a constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function, the test derived is still very similar, with the following 
resulting specification is: 
    (5) 
As before, if there was perfect consumption smoothing, then the coefficient on log income 
would be 0. Conducting this test in levels or logs can generate substantially different 
predictions as shown by Mace (1991). With CARA utility, the evidence obtained is consistent 
with the perfect insurance hypothesis. However, the converse is true when preferences are of 
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the CRRA form. CARA utility, however, has the unappealing feature that the amount 
invested in a risky asset is constant across wealth levels, which means that the wealthy invest 
a lower proportion of their portfolios in risky assets. Therefore, specification (5) is the more 
appealing form for the test. 
Similar tests, applied across different contexts, confirm this result. Attanasio and Szekely 
(2004) test for perfect risk sharing in Mexico. They use average village agricultural wages as 
an instrument for household income (which is endogenous due to measurement error) and 
reject the hypothesis of perfect risk sharing. Townsend (1995) implements this test on data 
from Thailand and soundly rejects the hypothesis of perfect risk sharing. Fafchamps and 
Lund (2003), similarly, find that consumption is not fully shared in rural Phillipines. 
An underlying assumption in the tests described above is that agents have identical risk 
preferences. However, this is likely to be untrue in most environments. Mazzocco and Saini 
(2009) argue and show that the imposition of this assumption may drive the rejection of the 
perfect risk sharing hypothesis by the conventional general equilibrium tests. This is because 
efficient risk sharing in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate shocks calls for 
two things: pooling income to share idiosyncratic risk (called income pooling) and insuring 
aggregate shocks by pooling income and sharing it according to individual risk preferences 
(called mutual insurance). The standard test assumes that there is no mutual insurance, and 
therefore rejects efficient risk sharing, even in instances where risk is perfectly shared. They 
then derive a sequence of tests that relax this rather strong assumption and test the perfect risk 
sharing hypothesis under heterogeneity in preferences. The authors apply their tests to data 
from India and strongly reject the assumption of identical risk preferences. Once they allow 
for heterogeneous risk preferences, they reject the hypothesis of perfect risk sharing at the 
village level, but cannot reject it when the test is applied at the level of the caste23.  
 
A number of papers have also studied the implications of shocks other than income shocks on 
consumption smoothing. Gertler and Gruber (2002) test for the effectiveness of risk sharing 
instruments in smoothing consumption following an idiosyncratic health shock to the head of 
the household in Indonesia. The specification they use is similar to (4), with  indicating 
changes in the health status of the household head. They find evidence that disability shocks 
are imperfectly insured. 
 
Mohanan (2008) exploits a quasi-experiment to identify the effects of exogenous health 
shocks on household consumption in India. The exogenous shock considered is being injured 
in a bus accident. He constructs a comparison group based on matching on gender, age, 
location of residence and bus routes used. To identify the effect of the health shock on 
consumption, he regresses household consumption on the shock and a set of household 
specific characteristics. He finds that households adjust to the shock by reducing educational 
and festival expenses and taking on debt. Food consumption is not affected. A drawback of 
his study is that he has data from a single cross-section only and so is unable to account for 
                                                            
23 This result is consistent with findings by Morduch (1991) and are explored in more detail in section 1.5. 
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any unobserved differences between the households affected by the shock and the 
comparison households, which could affect consumption. 
 
Thus far, the literature summarised tests the perfect risk sharing hypothesis by considering 
consumption smoothing only. As mentioned in section 1.2, risk also has important 
consequences for investment decisions. A number of papers test for the implications of 
idiosyncratic shocks on household decisions related to investment in human capital and 
physical capital. We briefly summarise some recent results here. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) 
study the effects of seasonal fluctuations on income on child school attendance among 
agrarian households in India and find evidence that households insure themselves against 
these fluctuations by taking children out of school, though this has little effect on long term 
human capital outcomes. Beegle et al (2006) find that child labour increases and school 
enrolment falls following an income shock among households in rural Tanzania. Duryea et al 
(2007) find that unemployment shocks increase the probability of children entering the labour 
force, of dropping out of school and also adversely affects the child’s progression in school in 
Brazil. 
  
1.3.2 Conclusions 
One key conclusion emerges from this literature: Though households are able to smooth their 
consumption to a surprising extent when faced by idiosyncratic shocks, they do not achieve 
perfect smoothing. This result is supported by evidence from numerous settings across the 
world, suggesting that there exist barriers to perfect risk sharing. Numerous researchers have 
integrated some of these frictions into models of risk sharing and consumption smoothing 
(Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002), Kinnan (2010)), which we discuss 
in more detail in the next sub-section. 
1.4 Barriers to risk sharing 
The literature has focused on 3 main frictions that limit the ability of households to share risk 
perfectly. These are: 
1) Limited commitment 
2) Hidden action 
3) Hidden income 
Limited commitment refers to the fact that in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms 
(such as the courts of law), arrangements between households to share risk should be self-
sustaining, that is, no household should want to walk away. To understand when this would 
happen, consider 2 households that have an informal arrangement to help each other. If one 
household receives a very high income and the other a low income, the household with high 
income would be tempted to keep this income and renege on informal arrangements with the 
other household. Therefore, not all risk sharing arrangements would be supported when there 
is limited commitment. 
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Coate and Ravallion (1993) show that limited commitment results in informal arrangements 
that are worse than the first-best outcome of perfect insurance. The intuition for this can be 
seen from the example above: since some risk sharing arrangements cannot be supported 
under limited commitment, there will be states of the world where households will have to 
bear some risk. Coate and Ravallion use results from the theory of repeated games to 
characterise constraints under which an informal arrangement between 2 households in this 
environment would be self-sustaining. The arrangement is sustained through the use of 
punishments: any household that deviates ends the informal arrangement between the 
households and there will be no trade between households in the future. The authors 
characterise the constraints under the assumption that consumption in any period depends on 
resources available in that period only. This assumption is rather restrictive as it rules out 
borrowing between the households. Numerous studies in developing countries show that 
informal borrowing is widely used to help smooth consumption (see for instance Udry 
(1994)).   
Kocherlakota (1996) relaxes this assumption and characterises the properties of the optimal 
risk sharing contract under limited commitment. He shows that in the presence of limited 
commitment, the history of one’s actions and shocks affects current consumption, and 
therefore, full risk sharing is not possible. The way in which the history of the interaction 
matters is as follows: if one household receives a high income in one period and the other 
household receives a low income, the high-income household may want to renege on the 
transfer he has to make to the low-income household under the informal arrangement they 
have. To prevent this from happening, the low-income household promises the high-income 
household higher transfers in the future, in exchange for help in this period. Therefore, future 
transfers will depend on the past and so perfect risk sharing may not be possible. A second 
feature of this contract is that of “amnesia”: If a household is constrained by the lack of 
commitment in any period, then the future course of the contract depends only on that period 
and not on the history of the contract. That is, the contract “re-sets” once any agent becomes 
constrained. This property has also been called “forgiveness”.  While Kocherlakota (1996) 
characterises the properties of the optimal contract, he does not provide an explicit 
characterisation of the contract. 
This is done by Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2003) in an important paper in this now-
extensive literature. They extend the work by Kocherlakota (1996) and show that the 
constrained efficient contract can be characterised by the ratio of marginal utilities of 
consumption of households. Under a first-best risk sharing contract, the ratio of marginal 
utilities of households should be constant across states and over time. Transfers between 
households are constructed to satisfy this condition. Under dynamic limited commitment, the 
constrained efficient contract follows the following rule: First, each state of nature is 
associated with an interval of ratios of marginal utilities. Current transfers can be computed 
from the observation that risk averse households will wish them to be such that the change in 
the ratio of the marginal utilities is minimised, given the current realised state and the ratio of 
marginal utilities from the previous period. That is, if the households are in a particular 
interval at the beginning of a period, then given the current realised state, transfers will be 
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constructed such that the ratio of marginal utilities remains in this same interval. However, 
the transfers required to do this could be such that one household becomes constrained (for 
instance, it could be asked to make a very large transfer, which it may not be able to). In this 
case, the ratio of marginal utilities would be at the boundary of any interval, and thus the ratio 
of marginal utilities would have to change, meaning that perfect risk sharing is not achieved.  
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2003) also find that the amnesia property derived by 
Kocherlakota (1996) holds, though they call it “forgiveness”. They then structurally estimate 
this model and compare the performance of the dynamic limited commitment model with the 
perfect risk sharing model and the “static” limited commitment model of Coate and Ravallion 
(1993). The authors find that the model does better in predicting the average response of 
household consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks than either of the alternative models 
considered. In particular, this response is in line with that observed in the data. However, they 
are unable to explain the distribution of consumption observed in the data: they predict more 
consumption inequality than is actually observed. 
The second barrier considered in this literature is that of hidden action, which is one 
important type of asymmetric information. Hidden action limits the amount of risk that is 
shared when an agent’s actions influence the realisation of the state of the world. The 
intuition for this is as follows: if households know that others will fully insure them in case of 
an adverse shock, and actions that reduce the probability of an adverse shock occurring, 
households will shirk. To incentivise the household to apply high enough efforts, the other 
households will limit the amount of risk they absorb, which means that households will face 
some risk. Ligon (1998) models this formally by allowing a household’s own actions to affect 
the distribution of states of the world (and hence output). He shows that in the presence of 
hidden information, agents’ inter-temporal marginal rates of substitution vary, whereas this 
parameter would be constant across agents in the perfect risk sharing model. He uses this 
observation to construct a test which compares the model with private information with the 
permanent income hypothesis (where only the credit and savings markets are available), and 
finds that in the 3 Indian villages he studies, the private information model performs much 
better than the permanent income hypothesis. One criticism of his test is that he is unable to 
distinguish between the hidden information model and the perfect risk sharing model. This 
particular barrier has not been studied much in this literature, partly because it is widely 
believed that since everyone knows each other and information is widely shared in villages, 
asymmetric information is not a very problematic barrier in rural contexts. This belief was 
strengthened by evidence from Udry (1994) which suggests that hidden information is not 
much of a problem in rural Nigeria. The results from Ligon (1998), however, suggest that this 
may not be the case in rural areas everywhere. This barrier certainly needs to be further 
explored in future work.  
The third barrier to attain full risk sharing is hidden income. Hidden income arises when 
income is observed imperfectly or even when income cannot be perfectly verified by a third 
party, and hence economic agents cannot write contracts contingents on income. 
Consequently, only low transfers will be made to agents claiming to have low income due to 
a shock, because if the transfers were large everyone would have an incentive to lie about 
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their income levels. This barrier has not been studied much in the literature. Kinnan (2010) 
models this barrier, along with the other two barriers considered here – hidden action and 
limited commitment- and sets out to derive a test that can distinguish between these 3 barriers 
to risk sharing. To this end, she shows that a household’s lagged inverse marginal utility is a 
sufficient statistic for lagged current marginal utility when limited commitment and hidden 
action are the barriers constraining perfect risk sharing, but is not a sufficient statistic when 
the relevant barrier is hidden income. Therefore, if one regresses a household’s current 
inverse marginal utility (which can be replaced by log consumption when utility is of CRRA 
form) on the lagged inverse marginal utility and lagged income, we would expect lagged 
income to have a coefficient of 0 if the relevant barrier preventing full risk sharing is either 
limited commitment or hidden action. A non-zero coefficient implies that hidden income is 
the relevant barrier. Kinnan implements this test on 7 years of monthly data from Thailand 
and finds that lagged income has predictive power in forecasting a household’s current 
inverse marginal utility. An advantage of this test is there is no need for structural estimation, 
which is often required to solve dynamic contracts. More work needs to be done to see if this 
result generalises to other settings, though one drawback in applying this same test is the need 
for a long time series of data, which is rarely available for village economies in developing 
countries.  
The presence of these barriers and frictions suggests that interventions from outside parties 
could be welfare-enhancing. Moreover, the evidence from the literature gives suggestions on 
the form of interventions and policies that would be most effective in improving consumption 
smoothing and hence welfare.   
1.5 Risk is shared in Networks 
 
A reason for the rejection of the perfect risk sharing test outlined in section 1.2 is that the 
community or village is not the relevant institution in which households share risk. Indeed, a 
number of papers in the literature have found that in rural communities, risk is not shared at 
the level of the community, but rather, within social networks.  
 
In an early paper in this literature, Morduch (1991) applied a test similar to (5) to a measure 
of a social network in rural Indian villages: the caste. He fails to reject the hypothesis of 
perfect risk sharing of food consumption within the caste network. In further work, though, 
Morduch (2004) finds that there is substantial variation across castes in the degree of risk 
shared, with some castes being relatively better insured than others. All the same, the former 
conclusion is supported by work by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) who document that caste 
networks are an important source of mutual insurance in rural India.  
 
An important paper in this literature uses data that was specifically collected to study how 
consumption is smoothed in rice-farming villages in rural Phillipines. Fafchamps and Lund 
(2003) use a unique dataset on rural Filipino households, and find that households receive 
help following an adverse shock in the form of gifts and informal loans primarily from 
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networks of friends and relatives rather than from the community at wide. Moreover, these 
networks are not limited to a village, but are across villages. This evidence has led to a 
growing theoretical literature (which is summarised below) that develops models of risk 
sharing and insurance, based on bilateral arrangements between households embedded in a 
social network.  
 
Another institution that has been found to be important for risk sharing is the extended family 
and kinship network. Angelucci et al (2010) identify extended family networks in rural 
Mexican villages from the naming convention in use in Mexico, which includes the surname 
of one’s father and mother in one’s own surname. Using this data, they document that 
following a positive exogenous shock from the introduction of a Conditional Cash Transfer 
programme (CCT) programme, there is better risk sharing among households with relatives 
in the village compared to those without relatives. They also find that connected households 
are less likely to withdraw children from school or send them to work in the case of a health 
shock in the household. Kinnan and Townsend (2010) study how kinship networks and 
connections to financial institutions aid households in smoothing consumption and 
investment in villages in Thailand. They find that households that are connected directly or 
indirectly (via people they transact with, who may or may not be kin) to financial institutions 
are able to smooth their consumption better, while those with more kin are able to smooth 
investment better.  
 
Bloch et al (2007) develop a model of risk sharing between households in a social network, 
where risk is shared via bilateral transfers. They show that a self-sustaining risk sharing 
arrangement in a network setting can only be sustained in low or high density networks, 
where density is defined to be the proportion of possible network connections that exist. This 
result is intuitive: in sparsely connected networks, where almost no one shares risk with one 
another, a person who deviates from the insurance arrangement would not be an important 
source of insurance anyways. Conversely, networks that are densely connected are better able 
to punish deviators (a deviator is excluded from the network completely and so deviation is 
very costly when the network is very dense), and hence are stable. 
 
Ambrus et al (2010) study the efficiency of risk sharing in networks of different structures. 
They show that the amount of risk shared within a network depends on the structure of the 
network, particularly, to a feature of the network called the expansiveness. Expansiveness is 
defined to be the ratio of the perimeter of the network to the area of the network, that is, the 
number of links that agents on the edges of the network have going out of the network 
relative to the number of agents in the network. Networks that are highly expansive allow for 
more risk sharing by allowing for more channels through which shocks can be propagated in 
a network.   
This strand of the literature is currently very active, with lots of on-going work.  
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1.6 Policy Interventions and Consumption Smoothing 
The presence of barriers to risk sharing suggests a role for intervention from outside parties. 
A growing literature has considered the effects of policy interventions on households’ ability 
to smooth consumption. This sub-section examines some of these studies: 
1.6.1 Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes have become immensely popular over the past 
decade as a tool for improving investments in human capital in poor communities of many 
developing countries and now even some developed countries. Interventions of this kind 
generally provide a cash transfer to mothers on the fulfilment of certain conditions such as 
taking children under 5 for regular vaccination and health checks and sending children to 
school. The cash transfer can aid households in better smoothing their consumption by 
providing relatively stable source of income to households.  
However, as Albarran and Attanasio (2003) point out, there could be no increase in 
household welfare or households could even be left worse off if the public cash transfer 
displaces informal transfers the household would have otherwise received. They test this 
crowding our hypothesis in a model with limited commitment, using data from a randomised 
evaluation of a CCT programme in Mexico, called Progresa (now Oportunidades) and find 
that CCTs are limited in improving consumption smoothing as they crowd out private 
transfers.  
CCT programmes can improve outcomes including consumption for households other than 
direct beneficiaries of the programme as documented by Angelucci & De Giorgi (2009). In 
further work, Angelucci et al (2010) show that the positive income shock brought by the CCT 
transfer is shared within the extended family network of the beneficiary households. This 
network is also the relevant institution via which risk is shared: Consumption of relatives of 
households who are eligible for the cash transfer increases once the transfer is implemented, 
but that for households that are not related to eligible households does not. Further, 
households embedded in an extended family network are less likely to withdraw children 
from school or send them to work following a health shock within the household.   
1.6.2 Banking and financial markets 
Another policy that can expand risk sharing opportunities for households in this context is the 
expansion of banking and financial markets. In particular, the introduction of a bank or 
microfinance institution can introduce more efficient savings instruments and expand credit 
provision, and hence provide households with more effective methods of smoothing their 
consumption.  
A handful of studies have investigated the effects of microcredit, which provides credit often 
without collateral24, on risk sharing. Morduch (1998) finds evidence, using a quasi-
experimental design using data from Bangladesh, that access to microfinance reduces 
                                                            
24 Microcredit was initially provided to groups of individuals under joint liability arrangements, that is, the 
group would be responsible for repayment of the loan on any group member that defaults. Recently, however, 
microcredit providers have provided small loans based on individual liability 
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variability of household consumption across seasons. Kaboski and Townsend (2006) find, 
using quasi-experimental variation, that households in villages with well-run village-level 
microfinance institutions achieved improved consumption smoothing. 
 
1.6.3 Community Based Interventions 
Community-based interventions are interventions that involve the local community (most 
usually, a village) at some step of the intervention, be it in targeting, volunteering, or more 
extensive participation at every step of the way. Participatory community interventions are a 
subset of community based interventions which involve beneficiaries at numerous points of 
the intervention, from the design and management or the intervention to group meetings to 
choosing local public goods and implementing the chosen goods. In some cases, communities 
even have direct control of project resources. Such interventions have become immensely 
popular, with funding by the World Bank for such projects standing at $7 billion in 2006. 
Section 2 of this literature review summarises some of the more recent work on this subject. 
In this sub-section, we focus on the work on community based interventions and risk sharing.  
Community based interventions and groups offer two possible channels through which they 
may improve consumption smoothing. First, these groups allow for the pooling of income 
risk, and hence for group-based risk sharing schemes. Fafchamps and La Ferrara 
(forthcoming) study income pooling within self help groups, a type of community based 
intervention in which individuals pool capital to form a group that functions much like a 
production co-operative. They find that such incomes are highly correlated among group 
members, but that this correlation does not arise from the self-selection of similar individuals 
into a group. The authors interpret this as evidence that these self help groups serve a mutual 
assistance role. 
Second, they can help reduce barriers to risk sharing: for instance, community based 
interventions may increase social interactions and thereby enable improved enforcement of 
informal arrangements and improved information transmission within a community, hence 
easing barriers to risk sharing.  
The intuition for how increased information can improve enforcement of is as follows: 
Agents who interact once only will choose the action that benefits them the most, which may 
not be one that maximises social welfare. If, however, they were to interact more than once, 
they could choose actions that deliver outcomes that are pareto optimal, because with many 
interactions agents have opportunities to punish those that deviate from an agreed action. 
That is, more frequent interaction reduces the enforcement constraint to informal risk sharing 
arrangements. This is an important result from the theory of repeated games which shows that 
societies can sustain actions that cannot be sustained in a one-shot interaction if the 
interaction is repeated infinitely often.  
Moreover, when information is not public, increased interactions provide individuals with 
more opportunities to learn about other members of the community and hence reduce 
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asymmetric information, which has been shown to be an important barrier to informal 
insurance arrangements (Kinnan (2010)).  
A number of policy interventions call for social interactions between community members. 
For instance, CCT programmes usually have regular meetings for mothers where they work 
on social issues, microfinance providers give loans to groups of women who meet regularly 
to re-pay loans, community driven development calls for community groups to manage 
resources and so on. However, very little work has studied the effects of such interaction on 
other economic outcomes. 
To our knowledge, Feigenberg et al (2010) is the only paper that considers the effects of 
exogenous increases in social interactions on risk sharing. The authors vary exogenously the 
social distance between clients of a microfinance institution in India by randomly choosing 
clients in certain communities to meet either once a week or once a month to make 
repayments on the microloans borrowed25. The authors find that clients in groups mandated 
to meet more frequently increased their social contact outside the microfinance group, with 
substantially increasing the probability of them visiting each others’ homes, and attend social 
events together.  They further find that clients in groups meeting weekly received higher 
transfers following a health shock, which is taken as evidence of improved risk sharing. One 
major drawback of their study is that they do not have the data to directly test for 
improvements in risk sharing. 
To strengthen the evidence for improved risk sharing, the authors implemented a laboratory 
experiment in the field, whereby clients were each entered in a separate lottery in which the 
client had a 1/11 chance of winning a Rs. 200 ($5) promotional coupon. The client also had 
the opportunity to enter other group members in the lottery, which would reduce her direct 
probability of winning the coupon, but would increase the probability that someone in the 
group won. This part of the lottery experiment was designed to measure changes in 
cooperation due to increased interactions. To measure the effects of the increased social 
interactions on risk sharing, a subset of clients played a variant of the lottery experiment. In 
this variant, the client was given his winnings as 4 Rs.50 coupons rather than a single Rs. 200 
coupon. To interpret the results of this latter lottery experiment as a change in risk sharing, 
one needs to assume that a more divisible prize eases risk sharing. While their results from 
this experiment support their hypotheses that increased social interactions improved 
cooperation and resource sharing, it is not clear whether actual risk sharing changed. The 
lottery was a modest positive shock to the participants in the experiment, and social norms for 
sharing a positive shock may be very different from informal arrangements and norms for the 
sharing of adverse shocks or for shocks of larger magnitudes. Second, this paper is unable to 
say anything about the magnitude of any effect of increased social interactions on 
consumption smoothing. 
Further research is needed to investigate whether policy interventions that reduce barriers to 
risk sharing do result in improved risk sharing. 
                                                            
25 The clients in this microfinance group all had individual liability loans, but met regularly to make repayments 
to the staff from the microfinance institution.  
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2 Community Based Interventions and Other Economic Outcomes 
Our work also contributes to another strand of literature, which considers the effects of 
community based interventions, including participatory interventions. As mentioned before, 
such interventions have been increasing in popularity, and have been employed in a number 
of contexts. A growing literature has considered the usefulness of such interventions on 
monitoring of public services, provision of local public goods, in post-conflict settings, in 
building social capital and in its vulnerability to elite capture. Here, we provide a brief 
summary of this literature. 
Mansuri and Rao (2004) provide an excellent critical review of the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of community based interventions and summarises some early studies in this area. 
Their review also highlights the wide range of projects that fall under the umbrella of 
community based interventions and community driven development and also  the dearth of 
well-designed impact evaluations investigating the effects of such interventions on socio-
economic outcomes. In this review, we focus on results from some recent studies. Note 
though that this is not a comprehensive review of this literature.  
a. Community	Based	Interventions	and	Monitoring	of	Public	Services	
 
Olken (2007) tested the effectiveness of community participation in reducing corruption 
related to building roads in Indonesia. He contrasts the effectiveness of grass roots 
participation through community meetings with project staff with top-down government 
audits in reducing corruption, through a randomised trial. He finds that community 
monitoring fails to reduce corruption on average, even though actual community participation 
in the meetings increased. Though there was no reduction in average total missing 
expenditures (his measure of corruption), he finds a significant reduction in corruption on a 
measure that could be easily monitored by community members – missing labour 
expenditures, but not on missing materials expenditures which accounted for a large 
proportion of the corruption.  
 
Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) investigate the effects of a participatory, community based 
monitoring intervention in Uganda. The intervention was randomly allocated and focused on 
public primary health care providers. Community members in randomly selected 
communities were invited to two meetings where staff from local community based 
organisations provided them with information on the state of their local public health care 
provider and encouraged them to hold the provider to account for their performance. This 
intervention generated large increases in the usage of health care services. Further, the 
authors also find large improvements in health, particularly child health as measured by the 
under-5 mortality rate and the weight of infants and young children. 
 
Banerjee et al (2010) conducted a randomised experiment to assess the effectiveness of three 
ways of increasing community participation – providing information on the role and structure 
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of village education committees, providing this information along with tools to gather 
information on local educational performance, and proving the information and tools and 
training local volunteers on a pedagogical technique for reading, on improving education 
outcomes in poor, rural villages in India. They find that none of the interventions improved 
community participation in schools or child performance in school, even though participation 
in meetings organised by the implementing NGO was high. The third intervention, though, 
generated significant improvements in reading skills among children who attended reading 
camps organised by the trained volunteers; that is, outcomes improved for learning outside 
schools. These results suggest that in some contexts, increasing community participation 
alone is not sufficient to improve outcomes.  
2.2	Community	Based	Interventions	in	Post‐Conflict	Settings	
Community driven development (CDD) projects have been widely used in post-conflict 
settings, and are seen as a way of re-building institutions while providing communities with 
public goods. Experimental studies of these interventions have investigated impacts of the 
increased social interaction and participation on social cohesion. Fearon et al (2009) report 
the results of a randomised field experiment evaluating a community driven reconstruction 
intervention implemented in post-conflict Liberia. The intervention implementer oversaw the 
formation of community development communities (CDC) which were tasked with managing 
a community-wide process to select and implement 2 public goods projects, which were to be 
implemented sequentially, with a small project implemented initially followed by a larger 
project. The authors first investigate the impact of this intervention on social cohesion, which 
is measured by a community-wide public goods game. They find that the intervention 
improved cohesion and co-operation by this measure.  
 
Another study by Casey et al (2010) in post-conflict Sierra Leone studies the impacts of a 
CDD programme that provided rural villages with funds for local public goods, skills training 
along with assistance establishing village management communities and encouraging 
participation of socially disadvantaged groups such as women. They report the results of a 
randomised evaluation of this intervention. They find that the intervention improved local 
public good provision, more equal public good access and increased household assets and 
market activity within communities that received the intervention, but find no evidence of 
spill-over effects to wider social norms related to collective action. These interventions have 
some features that are similar to the intervention we are evaluating: they encourage 
community participation in improving community outcomes, they provide training and 
guidance on leadership and organisational structures. However, two dimensions on which the 
intervention we evaluate varies from these ones are: 
1) Women are at the core of the intervention: the intervention relates to reproductive 
health outcomes and involved men were not involved until a much more advanced 
stage of the intervention 
2) No funds were disbursed by the implementing organisation to the communities 
(though about 4 years after the start of the intervention, the NGO provided some 
modest funds ($5,000 across over 500 community groups) to be disbursed as micro-
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credit loans). The community groups started by this intervention identified and 
implemented resource mobilisation strategies. 
 
2.3	Social	Capital	
Another outcome considered in the literature, though not very widely, is social capital.  
Labonne and Chase (2011) investigate the effects of a large CDD programme in rural 
Phillipines. The programme encouraged village members to participate and put together 
proposals for small scale infrastructure investments, which are subsequently submitted to 
municipalities and of which a subsample are funded. The programme involved villager 
participation at specific points and could have potentially improved social capital. The 
authors test whether this is the case using propensity score matching techniques. They find 
evidence of increased villager participation in village meetings and some limited evidence of 
improvements in generalised trust. However, villager participation in groups fell in 
communities that received the CDD intervention.  
2.4	Elite	Capture	
A growing literature has also investigated concerns of elite capture, which are considered to 
be particularly likely in participatory community interventions. Elite capture refers to the fact 
that wealthy and well connected community members – the “elite” -  are able to appropriate 
resources and benefits from the intervention for themselves, at the expense of more 
disadvantaged and marginalised community members (see Platteau and Gaspart (2003)).  
Gugerty and Kremer (2008) study the effects of a randomly allocated intervention that 
provided outside funds and support to existing women’s groups in rural Kenya. The funds 
and support intended to expand organisational strength. However, they found no 
improvements in organisational strength. Rather, group participation changed substantially, 
with local elites joining the groups and taking leadership positions, while marginalised 
groups within the community were pushed out of the group. 
 
Labonne and Chase (2009) study a large community driven development (CDD) project in 
the Phillipines. Using data on successful and unsuccessful funding proposals put forward by 
villages, along with detailed household data covering over 1000 villages, they find little 
evidence of elite capture: both the community and elected leader’s opinions are equally 
reflected in the community proposal. Further, poor and politically active communities were 
more likely to receive funds. More unequal villages were more likely to receive funds (for 
any given level of poverty), though in these communities, the village leaders were more able 
to override community members’ wishes when selecting the proposal to put forward. 
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2.5 Self Help Groups and Economic Outcomes 
Deininger and Lu (2010) study the impacts of a community based organisation - self-help 
groups - in India. In this setting, self-help groups (SHGs) consist primarily of women who 
come together to mobilize savings and obtain credit (for which they are eligible once a 
certain amount of savings have been gathered). The authors use a propensity score matching 
technique, and exploit the staggered introduction of an intervention encouraging the 
formation of self help groups in one state of India to identify its impacts on female 
empowerment, nutrition and other household socio-economic outcomes. They find that SHGs 
improve female empowerment (even for women who didn’t attend the SHGs), nutritional 
status and consumption.  
In this literature review, we summarise a few recent papers investigating the socio-economic 
impacts of CDDs. However, our investigation of the literature revealed a lack of rigorous 
well-defined evaluations of such interventions, particularly studies investigating impacts on 
socio-economic outcomes. 
3 Conclusions 
This literature review has summarized the methodology used to assess how well households 
smooth their consumption in developing countries. Though households are not able to smooth 
their consumption fully, they manage to attain a substantial amount of smoothness in their 
consumption. Limited commitment, hidden action and hidden income are the main 
hypothesis that explain why consumption is not fully insured. Depending on the particular 
setting, individuals might share consumption risk among others in the village or mostly with 
individuals belonging to their same group (kinship, caste, religious group, family, etc). We 
have also analyzed the effect of different interventions that might help households to smooth 
their consumption. We have paid particular attention to participatory community 
interventions because they share some features with the Women Group intervention that will 
be the object of our research.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
